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This dissertation contributes to the literature on social security by estimating the 
effects of this payroll tax on several labor market outcomes in Colombia, and by 
evaluating how these effects vary according to the workers’ valuation of the benefits. 
Colombia provides an interesting case study because the country implemented a social 
security reform in 1993 that increased the payroll tax rate by over 10 percentage points 
and improved both quantity and quality of benefits. To identify the effects of this reform I 
use cross-sectional data from the Colombian National Household Survey for the years 
1984 to 1996. In the first chapter, I analyze the relationship between social security taxes 
and the employment sector choice of workers. I find that the reform increases the 
proportion of females employed in the formal sector of the economy, defined as the 
sector that complies with social security regulations, by 6 percentage points while it 






second chapter, I estimate what fraction of social security contributions employers pass 
on to workers in the form of lower hourly wages. My results show that the wages of 
females (males) in the formal sector decrease (increase) by 5% (2%) relative to the wages 
of those in the informal sector. In the third chapter, I examine the effect of social security 
contributions on weekly hours worked. My findings indicate that the reform reduces the 
work of women in the formal sector by 2 hours relative to the hours worked by those in 
the informal sector, whereas it does not have a significant impact on the hours worked by 
men. The effects of the reform on wages and hours are particularly important among 
married mothers and single head-of-household women, whereas for married women 
without children, single dependent women, and men in any family structure group the 
effects are insignificant. The patterns of how the effects vary across demographic groups 
are theoretically consistent, within a model of employment sector choice, with the link 
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This dissertation contributes to the literature on social security by estimating the 
effects of this payroll tax on several labor market outcomes in Colombia, and by 
evaluating how these effects vary according to the workers’ valuation of the benefits. 
Although I do not observe this valuation directly, I believe that headship, parenthood, and 
marital status are good proxies for it. Colombia provides an interesting case study 
because contributions for pension and health care provisions amount to a quarter of the 
wage bill there. This, in conjunction with an 11% average contribution for other payroll 
taxes, positions Colombia as the country with the highest payroll tax rate in Latin 
America. Furthermore, the Colombian social security reform of 1993, which transformed 
the institutional framework for pension funds and health care provisions, constitutes a 
large exogenous change that allows me to identify the effects of these contributions. This 
reorganization increased the payroll tax rate by over 10 percentage points and improved 
both quantity and quality of benefits. The comparison of the effects of this reform with 
other Latin American experiences, such as the ones in Chile and Mexico, constitute an 
important reference point for policy makers in developed and developing countries. To 
estimate the impacts of this change, I use cross-sectional data from the Colombian 
National Household Survey for the years 1984 to 1996. 
The first chapter of my dissertation analyzes the relationship between social security 
taxes and employment sector choice. The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, I 
study here the effects of a benefit-linked payroll tax given that there is a connection 
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between the taxes paid by or on behalf of each worker and that individual’s expected 
benefits, whereas previous empirical studies analyzed the effects of general payroll taxes 
that have no linkage to benefits for the individual taxpayer. Second, in this study I 
consider a large fraction of the wage–and-salary sector that evades payroll taxes, while 
most of the literature on tax policy and employment sector choice focuses on 
industrialized economies and only considers the transition between a wage-and-salary job 
and self employment.  
In this chapter I estimate a multinomial logit model of the probability that a worker 
belongs to any of four employment sectors: formal, wage-and-salaried informal, self 
employment, and non-market participation. I find that the reform generates a 6 
percentage point increase in females formal employment probability, a 2.5 percentage 
point reduction in both self employment and non-market participation, and a 1 percentage 
point fall in salaried informality. On the other hand, the reform increases males’ formal 
employment probability by only 3 percentage points, reduces salaried informality by 2.5 
percentage points, decreases self-employment by 0.7 percentage points, and has an 
insignificant effect on non-market participation. Although the pension and health care 
reforms both generate an increase in formality in the aggregate, they have a differential 
impact on the sectoral composition of employment across family structure groups. 
Among females, my results show that for married women the reform is the basis for a 
transition from non-market participation and self employment into formality, especially 
for those with young children. Conversely, for single head-of-household and single 
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dependent women the reform causes, in addition to the previous changes, a shift from 
salaried informality into formality.   
In the second chapter of my dissertation, I adopt a difference-in-difference approach 
to estimate what fraction of social security contributions employers pass on to workers in 
the form of lower wages. My work extends the literature by (1) estimating how this effect 
varies according to the workers’ valuation of the benefits, (2) considering a broad set of 
economic activities and occupations, and (3) controlling for the omitted variable bias 
arising from unobserved heterogeneity. My results indicate that the hourly wages of 
female workers with access to social security benefits decrease by 5% relative to the 
wages of those without access to the benefits. In contrast, the hourly earnings of male 
workers in the wage-and-salary formal sector increase by 2% relative to the earnings of 
those in the wage-and-salary informal sector.  The reduction in the relative wages of 
formal sector workers is particularly important among married mothers and single head-
of-household women, whereas for married women without young children, single 
dependent women, and men in any family structure group the effect is not significantly 
different form zero.  
Finally, the third chapter of my dissertation focuses on the effect of social security 
contributions on hours worked. I concentrate on prime age workers and investigate how 
variations on the valuation of the benefits across family structure groups affect the 
estimates. I find that the social security reform has a negative effect on the hours of work 
of women in the formal sector, reducing their weekly work by 2 hours relative to the 
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weekly work of those in the informal sector of the economy. This effect is particularly 
important among married mothers and single head-of-household women, whereas for 
married women without children, single dependent women, and men in any family 
structure group the effect is not statistically significant. The effect on women is mostly 
explained by a reduction in the proportion of females that work part-time in the informal 
sector, who switched to full-time jobs in the formal sector in order to get access to social 
security benefits for themselves and their families. 
The patterns of how the estimated effects of the reform on employment, wages, and 
hours of work vary across demographic groups are consistent with the theoretical link 
between the magnitude of the effects and the workers’ valuation of the social security 
benefits. Furthermore, these findings are theoretically consistent with a model of 
employment sector choice where the effect of the higher valuation of social security 



















                                                





Individuals can alter their employment decisions to avoid paying taxes. Consequently, 
an increase in a payroll tax could change the workers’ choice of employment sector. In 
this chapter I study how social security contributions promote or discourage informal 
employment, defined as employment in an underground sector that does not comply with 
labor and social security regulations, and I determine for whom such incentives have the 
largest effects. I analyze in particular the impact of pensions and health care contributions 
on the choice of employment sector in Colombia. 
Most of the literature on taxes and employment choice has focused on income taxes 
and their effect on self employment in industrialized economies.1 Early time series and 
cross-sectional literature generally concludes that higher tax rates produce higher levels 
of self employment, supporting the notion that individuals become self-employed to 
avoid paying higher wage-and-salary taxes. However, Schuetze and Bruce (2004) point 
out that the latest studies that use panel data have found no conclusive evidence on the 
effects of taxes on self employment. They argue that, among other factors, the effect 
depends on the structure of the tax system and whether the increase in tax rates is 
accompanied by a change in the progressivity of the tax schedule. 
 
1 See Schuetze and Bruce (2004) for a detailed survey of the literature on tax policy and entrepreneurship. 
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The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, I study here the effects of a benefit-
linked payroll tax given that there is a connection between the taxes paid by or on behalf 
of each worker and that individual’s expected benefits, whereas previous empirical 
studies analyzed the effects of general payroll taxes that have no linkage to benefits for 
the individual taxpayer. Second, in this study I consider a large fraction of the wage–and-
salary sector that evades payroll taxes, while most of the literature on tax policy and 
employment sector choice focuses on industrialized economies and only considers the 
transition between a wage-and-salary job and self employment.  
Colombia provides an interesting case study because contributions for pension and 
health care provisions amount to a quarter of the wage bill there. This, in conjunction 
with an 11% average contribution for other payroll taxes, positions Colombia as the 
country with the highest payroll tax rate in Latin America. Furthermore, the Colombian 
social security reform of 1993, which transformed the institutional framework for pension 
funds and health care provisions, represents a large exogenous change that allows me to 
identify the effects of these contributions. The comparison of the effects of this reform 
with other Latin American experiences, such as the ones in Chile and Mexico, constitutes 
an important reference point for policy makers in developed and developing countries. 
The end of the 1980’s and early 1990’s was a period of deep structural 
transformations in Latin America. These reforms were part of efforts to liberalize 
economies and increase the participation of the market in the production and allocation of 
goods and services, and were the product of the collapse most economies experienced 
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during the 1980’s due to their mounting fiscal and monetary imbalances.2  In Colombia, 
the main reforms during this period included the approval of a new constitution, key 
reforms to the labor market, a major trade reform, and liberalization in direct foreign 
investment.  
Three years after these reforms were put in place Colombia implemented a social 
security reorganization that transformed the institutional framework for pension funds 
and health care provision (Law 100 of December 1993). Regarding the health care 
regime, the reform replaced the existing discretionary affiliation system that covered only 
the worker, with a mandatory one that features a stricter prepayment system and also 
covers the spouse and children or the parents of the worker. On the subject of pensions, 
the reform introduced a fully funded social security system, giving workers the choice 
between the traditional benefit defined in the existing pay-as-you-go scheme, and the new 
one of individual capitalization of public funds. The greater benefits also brought along 
an increase in employees and employers’ pension and health care contributions, raising 
the payroll tax rate by over 10 percentage points.  
In this chapter I hypothesize that the effect of these reforms on employment sector 
choice is determined by the workers valuation of the benefits financed by the social 
security contributions. Although I cannot measure this valuation directly, I believe that 
marital and headship status and the presence of young children in the household are good 
 
2 Heckman and Pages (2003). 
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proxies for this valuation.3 Consequently, I analyze the effect of the social security 
reform by categorizing agents according to their family structure type  and evaluating for 
each category how the probability of belonging to a given employment sector changes 
from before to during and after the reform. 
For each demographic group I estimated a multinomial logit model of the probability 
that a worker belongs to any of the following employment sectors: formal, wage-and-
salaried informal, self employment, and non-market participation. I find that a 10 
percentage point increase in payroll taxes accompanied by an improvement in the quality 
and quantity of the benefits, generates a 6 percentage point increase in females formal 
employment probability, a 2.5 percentage point reduction in both self employment and 
non-market participation, and a 1 percentage point fall in salaried informality. On the 
other hand, the reform increases males’ formal employment probability by only 3 
percentage points, reduces salaried informality by 2.5 percentage points, decreases self-
employment by 0.7 percentage points, and has an insignificant effect on non-market 
participation. 
Although the pension and health care reforms both generate an increase in formality 
in the aggregate, they have a differential impact on the sectoral composition of 
employment across family structure groups. The pension reorganization has a relatively 
higher positive impact than the health care reform on the probability of formal 
employment for single workers, while the opposite occurs for married workers, 
 
3 DeLeire and Levy (2004) use a similar strategy in their study of working sorting across occupations in 
response to the risk of death on the job. 
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regardless of the gender group considered. In particular, I find that for married women 
the health care reform is the basis for a transition from non-market participation and self 
employment into formality, especially for those with young children. In contrast, for 
single head-of-household and single dependent women the pension reform is the major 
cause of the shift from salaried informality, self employment, and non-market 
participation into formality. Regarding males, the pension reform shifts employment from 
salaried informality into self employment for single head-of-household men, and from 
salaried informality into formality for single dependants. Conversely, the health care 
reform reallocates married men from self employment into formality, and shifts single 
head-of-household and non-single dependent males from salary informality and self 
employment into formal employment.  
These findings contradict earlier literature on general payroll taxes that commonly 
concludes that higher tax rates generate higher levels of employment in the non-taxed 
sector. It is theoretically consistent, however, with a model of employment sector choice 
where the effects of the higher valuation of social security benefits and tighter link 
between benefits and contributions dominate the impact of the augmented contributions. 
Furthermore, the patterns of how these estimated effects vary across family structure 
groups are consistent with the theoretical link between the magnitude of the effects and 
the agent’s valuation of the benefits. 
I proceed by presenting in the next section a brief description of the social security 
reform in Colombia. In Section 1.3, I introduce an equalizing differences model of 
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employment choice that will serve to interpret the empirical results. In Section 1.4, I 
present the data and descriptive statistics and continue in Section 1.5 with a discussion of 
the empirical specification and the results. Section 1.6 concludes and outlines some 
directions for future research. 
 
1.2 The Colombian Social Security Reform of 1993 
 
 The social security reform of 1993 transformed the institutional framework for 
pension funds and health care provision.  Under the old health care system 15% of the 
population was covered by the public Social Security Institute (ISS), an additional 15% 
could afford private health care or was covered by alternative services, and the remaining 
70% did not have any access to proper health care services.4 The reorganization aimed to 
increase the quality and coverage of the system by implementing a regime based on 
competition among insurance administrators and health care providers. The reform 
replaced the existing social insurance system, which was in practice a last-resort 
individual health insurance mainly used by poor workers or higher income people with 
elevated health care costs, with a mandatory one with a stricter prepayment program that 
covers also the family of the worker and provides a choice between services.  
The reform also generated an increase in social security payroll taxes. The Table 1 
shows that health care contributions increased gradually from 7% in 1992, to 8% in April 
1994, and 12% in 1996.5 The employer must pay two thirds of these contributions, 
 
4 Farne (2003) 
5 The final increase actually occurred in January 1995. 
 
whereas the workers only pay one third. Consequently, the reform raised employer and 
employees’ contributions by 3.3 and 1.7 percentage points, respectively. 
Regarding pensions, the reform introduced a fully funded social security system 
giving the workers the choice between the benefit defined in the existing pay-as-you-go 
system, and the new one of individual capitalization of public funds in which pension 
benefits depend upon fund performance. As shown in Table 1, pension contributions 
increased gradually over a three-year period from 8% in 1992, to 11.5% in April 1994, to 
13.5% in January 1996.6  The employer must pay three fourths of the pension 
contributions and the workers the remaining one fourth. Consequently, the reform raised 
employer contributions by 4.84 percentage points, while it augmented employees’ 
contributions only by 0.67 percentage points. 
Table 1 
Employer Employee Total Employer Employee Total Employer Employee Total
Social Security Contributions 11.99     5.01       17.00  15.96     5.54       21.50  20.13     7.38       27.50  
Pensions (2) 5.29       2.71       8.00    8.63       2.88       11.50  10.13     3.38       13.50  
Health 4.70       2.30       7.00    5.33       2.67       8.00    8.00       4.00       12.00  
Professional Risks (3) 2.00       -         2.00    2.00       -         2.00    2.00       -         2.00    
Other Payroll Taxes 9.00       -         9.00    9.00       -         9.00    9.00       -         9.00    
Labor Training 2.00       -         2.00    2.00       -         2.00    2.00       -         2.00    
Social Assistance Programs 3.00       -         3.00    3.00       -         3.00    3.00       -         3.00    
Family Subsidy 4.00       -         4.00    4.00       -         4.00    4.00       -         4.00    
Source: Law 100 of 1993, Decree 685 of 1994, Decree 2926 of 1994,  Lora and Henao (1997), Lopez(2003).
(1) There is a 1 percent extra contribution for workers earnings more than 4 minimum wages
(2) The rate oscillates between 0.348%  and 8.7% according to the degree of risk associated with
 the  economic activity of the firm, its work injury rate, and its prevention programs The average is 2%. 
During-reform Rates (1994)
workers earning the minimum wage,  but it does not include it thereafter.
(1) Before the Law 100 of 1993 the basic wage used to calculate the contribution included a commuting subsidy for 
Mandatory NonWage Labor Costs
Percentage of Basic Wages (1)
Pre-reform Rates (1992) Post-reform Rates (1996)
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6 Although not shown in Table 1, pension contributions increased to 12.5% in January 1995. 
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Employers also have to make contributions to the General System of Professional 
Risks that covers health care expenses and gives economic compensations in the event of 
a work related accident or illness. The average contribution rate is 2% and it oscillates 
according to the degree of risk associated with the economic activity of the firm, its work 
injury rate, and its prevention programs. These contributions are supplementary to other 
payroll taxes that were originally established to finance different forms of social security 
such as the National Apprenticeship Service (SENA), the Colombian Family Welfare 
Institute (ICBF), and the Family Compensation Funds.  As seen in Table 1, these 
additional taxes over the wage bill amount to 9% of basic wages, but were not changed 
by the social security reform.7  
To summarize, the social security reform gradually increased the statutory pension 
and health care contributions by 10.5 percentage points. Figure 1 shows that the total 
increase in pension contributions was 5.5 percentage points, slightly greater than the 5 
percentage point increase in health care contributions. In addition, it shows that during 
the 1992-1994 period the increase in contributions was mainly due to pensions, while 
during the 1994-1996 period the increase was mostly explained by health care payments. 
Finally, Figure 1 shows that the statutory increase in employer social security 
contributions was 3.5 times that of the increase in employees’ contributions. 
The higher contributions were related to an increase in the quality and quantity of the 
benefits. For pensions, social security contributions were more closely related to benefits 
 
7  For a detailed analysis of these payroll taxes in Colombia see Alm & Lopez (2002), and Lopez (2003). 
 
for workers who changed to the individual capitalization system. Health-related social 
security contributions before the reform constituted in practice a last-resort individual 
health insurance but turned into a prepaid system that covers also the families and 
provides a choice between services.  
Figure 1 









































































        Source: Law 100 of 1993, Decree 685 of 1994, Decree 2926 of 1994,  
        Lora and Henao (1997), Lopez (2003). 
 
1.3 An Equalizing Differences Model of Employment Choice 
This theoretical model considers a formal sector covered by social security 
regulations that coexists with an informal or unprotected sector that evades them, in an 
economy where wages are competitively determined.  To model this kind of market I 
extend Rosen’s (1986) equalizing differences model in two ways. First, I allow for 
13 
 
benefit-linked payroll taxes to be levied on workers and firms in the formal sector. 
Second, I consider compliance with social security regulations as a productive amenity. 
As in Rosen (1986), I assume that workers have homogeneous skills and 
heterogeneous preferences defined over market consumption goods and social security 
benefits. Some jobs comply with the social security regulations and therefore have an 
amenity present, while some others evade the regulations offering jobs without the 
amenity.  Define (0, )iε ε∈  as the necessary compensation to make worker i  indifferent 
between a job that provides social security benefits and a job that doesn’t. This 
compensating variation depends on the extent to which employees value the access to 
social security benefits. If worker  does not value the amenities received through social 
security, then
i
0iε = . On the other hand, if the employees value the access to social 
security benefits they will require a compensation to relinquish those amenities 
and 0iε ≥ . The population density of iε  is given by ( / )f ε θ , which I assume to be 
continuous with meanθ and variance-covariance matrixΩ . 
Now allow for benefit linked payroll taxes to be levied on workers and firms in the 
formal sector. Define the competitively determined wages in the formal and informal 
sectors as , respectively; the payroll tax on firms as  and Fw Iw ft ; and the tax rate on 
workers as , such that the total payroll tax equals to et eT t t f= + . With these definitions in 
hand, let us define  as the workers’ after tax market wage 
differential between the informal and formal sector. Each individual applies to a job at 
ˆ I F ew w w t w t∆ = − + = ∆ + e
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which his/her utility is maximized. Accordingly, worker  chooses the formal sector if 
and only if the necessary compensation to make him/her relinquish the social security 
benefits is greater than the actual after tax market wage differential between the informal 
and the formal sector:
i
ˆi wε > ∆ . Correspondingly, worker i  chooses the informal sector 
if ˆi wε < ∆  and it is indifferent between the two types of jobs if ˆi wε = ∆  (see Figure 1.a in 
the Appendix). 
The supply of labor to each job type depends on ŵ∆  but not on  
independently. If is the number of agents in the economy, the supply of workers in the 
formal and informal sector is respectively given by: 












= − ∆ ≤
∆
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∆












= ∆ ≥      (2)  
      One obtains the supply function for each sector by specifying the distribution 
( / )if ε θ and integrating over the appropriate region.  
Regarding the labor demand, firms have to choose the job type offered to the market 
according to their technology and wages. They compare the benefits of belonging to the 
formal sector in terms of a higher productivity, to the greater after tax cost of complying 
with labor and social security regulations. The benefits of formality are potential 
productivity gains since firms in the informal sector must restrict their size and location 
to avoid detection by the regulatory agencies. Furthermore, the provision of health care 
 
benefits can potentially make workers in the compliant sector healthier and more 
productive. I model this by assuming that firms in the formal sector are at least as 
productive as firms in the informal sector; therefore, that compliance with the regulations 
is a productive amenity. If workers demand a wage premium to work without social 
security benefits, then a firm will never find it in its self interest to offer such jobs unless 
there where compensating advantages to its profitability. The advantage for firms in the 
informal sector is the evasion of social security contributions, other payroll taxes, and 
costly regulations not directly linked with benefits to the worker.  
Formally, consider a linear production function and define jia  as the value of the 
marginal product of labor of firm  in sector . In addition, recall j i ft  as the total payroll 
tax on firms including social security contributions. With these definitions in hand 
define F I ( ) (0,
j j j ) A a a a= − ∈ as the gain in productivity for belonging to the formal 
sector. Let have a probability density functionjA ( / )g A γ  that incorporates the size of 
each firm as well as its technology. I assume this distribution to be continuous with 
meanγ  and variance covariance matrixΨ . 
 In addition, let us define  as the firms’ after tax 
market wage differential between the formal and the informal sectors. This difference can 
be seen as the compensating advantage to the profitability of firms in the informal sector 
and is assumed to be positive. Then, a firm chooses the formal sector if and only if the 
gain in productivity obtained for choosing this sector, , is greater than the total tax cost 




of belonging to the formal sector, ft , minus the wage premium the firm would have had 
to pay to workers in the informal sector, w∆ .That is : jA w> ∆ .  Alternatively, the firm 
chooses the informal sector if the cost of belonging to this sector in terms of the lost in 
productivity, , plus the wage premium,jA w∆ , is lower than the benefits of tax evasion, 
ft . That is:
jA w< ∆ . The firm is indifferent between the two types of jobs if jA w= ∆  
(see Figure 1.a in the Appendix). 
If the total demand for labor is fixed at N, the relative demands of labor in the formal 
and informal sectors are given by:  
( / ) (1 ( ))
aD
F w
L Ng A dA N G wγ
∆




dL Ng t w
d w
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dL Ng t w
d t





    (3)           
0
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dL Ng t w
d w







dL Ng t w
dt
= − ∆ ≥;          (4)   
One obtains the demand function for each sector by specifying the distribution 
( / )g A γ and integrating over the appropriate region.  
As in the Rosen (1986) model, fixing the total number of workers to be assigned is 
what justifies working with the wage differential alone. The total number of people 
employed and the size distribution of firms is a function of the absolute level of after tax 
real wages, and a general equilibrium model would determine both of them. 
Nevertheless, this goes beyond the scope of this chapter and is taken as exogenous here.  
In this model the wage differential between the informal and the formal 
sector, , is going to adjust such that the relative supply and demand of Iw w w∆ = − F
 
workers in each job type equalize. As seen in equations (1) and (3) the relative supply of 
informal labor is increasing in w∆  and the relative demand for informal labor is 
decreasing in , so the standard stability conditions for market equilibrium are met and 
the equilibrium is unique. In equilibrium 
w∆
w∆  adjusts to make: 
* * * * *(1 ( )) (1 ( )) ;    ( ) (F e f I e fL F w t G t w L F w t G t= − ∆ + = − −∆ = ∆ + = −∆
*)w      (5)                        
Figure 1.a in the Appendix shows a graphic representation of the equilibrium. As 
mentioned earlier, compliance with the social security regulation is a productive amenity. 
Consequently, there is a tendency toward positive assortive matching in equilibrium. 
Workers that have the highest valuation of social security benefits, iε , are matched with 
firms with the highest gain of compliance with regulations in terms of the productivity 
increase, . The Colombian social security reform increased both employees’ and 
employers contributions, strengthened the link between contributions and benefits, and 
augmented the worker’s valuation of the benefits of compliance. In what follows I use the 
equilibrium condition (5) to analyze the effect of such reforms on the equilibrium wage 
differential and the relative level of formal employment.  
 jA
i. Increase in Employees’ Contributions: A rise in the worker’s social security 
contributions reduces the relative supply of labor in the formal sector. Holding constant 
the workers’ valuation of the benefits, this decreases both the equilibrium wage 
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** ** ** * * *(1 ( ' )) (1 ( )) (1 ( )) (1 ( ))F e f F e fL F w t G t w L F w t G t w= − ∆ + = − −∆ ≤ = − ∆ + = − −∆  
ii. Increase in Employers Contributions: A rise in the firms’ social security 
contributions reduces the labor demand in the formal sector. Ceteris paribus, this 
increases the equilibrium wage differential and reduces the level of formal employment. 
That is: 
* ( ) (0,1)
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** ** ** * * *(1 ( )) (1 ( ' )) (1 ( )) (1 ( ))F e f F e fL F w t G t w L F w t G t w= − ∆ + = − −∆ ≤ = − ∆ + = − −∆  
iii. Increase in valuation of the benefits: Recall that iε  is the necessary 
compensation to make worker i  indifferent between a job that provides social security 
benefits and a job that doesn’t. Consequently, it depends on the benefit linkages of the 
contributions and the worker’s valuation of the social security benefits. A generalized 
augment in this valuation increases the value of i iε ∀ and therefore changes the 
distribution of iε .  The new cumulative distribution 2F ( )ε  gives less weight to the low 
valuation levels relative to the old distribution 1F ( )ε . Explicitly, the new distribution is 
such that 2 1 F ( ) F ( )ε ε∀ ≤ ε , that is, 2F ( ) ε first order stochastically dominates 1F ( )ε . This 
in turn translates into an increase in the supply of labor in the formal 
sector 2 2 1 1ˆ(1 ( )) (1 ( ))
s s




                                                
an increase in the valuation of the social security benefits, ceteris paribus, raises the 
equilibrium level of formal employment and the equilibrium wage differential between 
the informal and the formal sector.  
To summarize, the Colombian social security reform of 1993 implemented the three 
previously mentioned changes simultaneously. In cases (i) and (ii) the higher 
contributions reduce the equilibrium level of formal employment, whereas in case (iii) 
the higher valuation of the benefits raises it. The final impact on the sectoral composition 
of employment depends on which of these effects dominates.  If the effect of the higher 
valuations of the benefits dominates the one of the rise in contributions, then the level of 
formal employment increases. The opposite happens in the alternative case. In addition, 
the model predicts an increase in the equilibrium wage differential between the informal 
and the formal sector in cases (ii) and (iii), while it predicts a reduction in case (i).  The 
final result will depend on which of these effects dominates. In Colombia, however, the 
social security reform increased the employer’s contributions 3.5 times more than the 
employee’s contributions.8 Hence, I expect the impact of the higher employer’s 
contributions to dominate.  The actual magnitude of the effects is determined by the 
workers valuation of the benefits financed by these payroll taxes and the after-tax wage 




8 See Table 1 and Figure 1 
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1.4  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data I use for the estimation are the June waves of the Colombian National 
Household Survey for the years 1984, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, and 1996. The year 1990 
is not included in the sample due to data availability and because it is a period of deep 
structural transformations that affected the labor market. 9 The survey is a cross section 
administered in the ten most important metropolitan areas in the country. As seen in 
Figure 2, the year 1992 is a year of economic contraction while 1994 and 1996 are years 
of economic expansion that precede the big recession the country experienced in 1999. 
Hence, it is important to control for the business cycle in order identify the effect of the 
1993 social security reform on the sectoral composition of employment. To do so, I 
compare sectoral employment probabilities during the reform period with an earlier 
period that is similar in terms of the cycle. The corresponding control period comprises 
the years 1984, 1986 and 1988.10 
I use the June waves because every two years they include a special module on 
informality that has information on whether the individual is affiliated with the social 
security system through his/her job.  I make use of the availability of health social 
security benefits through the job, the individual’s employment status, and her occupation 
to sort workers into four employment sectors. I classify agents in the wage-and-salary 
formal sector (WSF) if they work as a salaried or domestic service worker and have 
access to social security benefits through their jobs. I categorize agents in the wage-and-
 
9 These changes include the approval of a new constitution, key reforms to the labor market, a major trade 
reform, and the liberalization in direct foreign investment. 
10 I estimated the business cycle using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter with lambda=6.25. 
 
salary informal (WSI) if they have a salaried job that does not provide health care social 
security benefits. I label workers as informal self-employed (SLF) if they are 
entrepreneurs, own account or unpaid family workers and do not have health social 
security benefits. Finally, the unemployed and the agents who do not participate in the 
market are grouped together in the non-market participation sector (NMP). 
Figure 2 
  Business Cycle

































































            Source:  Estimated by the author applying the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter  
           to GDP data from the  DANE - Banco de la República, Colombia 
I employ only the availability of health care benefits because the question regarding 
the affiliation to the pension plan only appears after 1996. These two measures are highly 
correlated, however. Before the reform the affiliations to health care and pensions plans 
perfectly coincide since the public Social Security Institute managed both of them. 




                                                
of the system altering this match. In 1996, 56% of the workers had access to health care 
benefits while only 47% had access to a pension plan. The higher coverage of the health 
care system is explained by the fact that the law requires proof of membership to it in 
order to affiliate a worker to the pension plan, but not the other way around.  
In my estimation sample I only consider working age population. That is, women 
between 18 and 55 years of age and men between 18 and 60 years of age, for an average 
of 45,000 observations per year. In the theoretical model previously described I argue 
that the effect of the social security reform varies according to the workers valuation of 
the benefits. Although I do not observe this valuation directly, I believe that the family 
structure of the agent is a good proxy for it. Consequently, in addition to the two gender 
categories that comprise all the data in my sample, I define four different family structure 
categories per gender group according to the agent’s headship, parenthood and marital 
status. These divisions are: married without young children, married with young children, 
single head-of-household, and single dependant.11 The previous categories contain 72 and 
84 percent of the female and male population in my sample, correspondingly.   
Table 2 shows the distribution of workers across employment sectors by gender and 
family structure group for each year in the sample. The fraction of all females that 
belongs to the formal sector is 27% in 1992, proportion that increases to 31% in 1996. 
The share of informal-salaried and self-employed workers in 1992 is 24%, equally split 
between the two sectors. Nonetheless, this fraction decreases to 20% after the reform. It 
 
11 I consider children younger than 6 years of age as young children. 
 
is interesting to note that the proportion of females in the non-market participation sector 
stays roughly constant at 49% during the reform period. 
 
Table 2 
Females Obs Mean S.e. Mean S.e. Mean S.e. Mean S.e.
All 1992 23679 27% 0.3% 12% 0.2% 12% 0.2% 49% 0.3%
1994 24037 29% 0.3% 11% 0.2% 12% 0.2% 48% 0.3%
1996 23927 31% 0.3% 10% 0.2% 10% 0.2% 49% 0.3%
Married 1992 6429 23% 0.5% 8% 0.3% 16% 0.5% 54% 0.6%
No 1994 6587 24% 0.5% 7% 0.3% 15% 0.4% 54% 0.6%
Children 1996 6663 27% 0.5% 6% 0.3% 12% 0.4% 55% 0.6%
Married 1992 5249 19% 0.5% 8% 0.4% 13% 0.5% 60% 0.7%
with 1994 5193 20% 0.6% 7% 0.3% 12% 0.4% 61% 0.7%
Children 1996 4931 23% 0.6% 6% 0.3% 10% 0.4% 61% 0.7%
Single 1992 503 54% 2.2% 15% 1.6% 15% 1.6% 16% 1.6%
Head 1994 640 53% 2.0% 14% 1.4% 15% 1.4% 18% 1.5%
1996 684 54% 1.9% 15% 1.4% 13% 1.3% 18% 1.5%
Single 1992 4868 32% 0.7% 12% 0.5% 6% 0.3% 50% 0.7%
Dependant 1994 4937 36% 0.7% 11% 0.5% 5% 0.3% 47% 0.7%
1996 4954 36% 0.7% 10% 0.4% 5% 0.3% 49% 0.7%
Males
All 1992 20705 43% 0.3% 19% 0.3% 23% 0.3% 15% 0.3%
1994 21123 44% 0.3% 18% 0.3% 23% 0.3% 15% 0.2%
1996 21204 45% 0.3% 16% 0.3% 20% 0.3% 18% 0.3%
Married 1992 6138 50% 0.6% 13% 0.4% 29% 0.6% 8% 0.3%
No 1994 6316 49% 0.6% 13% 0.4% 30% 0.6% 7% 0.3%
Children 1996 6410 52% 0.6% 11% 0.4% 26% 0.5% 11% 0.4%
Married 1992 5233 50% 0.7% 19% 0.5% 27% 0.6% 4% 0.3%
with 1994 5168 50% 0.7% 19% 0.5% 28% 0.6% 3% 0.2%
Children 1996 4914 52% 0.7% 18% 0.5% 25% 0.6% 6% 0.3%
Single 1992 566 47% 2.1% 18% 1.6% 26% 1.8% 10% 1.2%
Head 1994 623 48% 2.0% 16% 1.5% 26% 1.8% 10% 1.2%
1996 606 53% 2.0% 15% 1.4% 23% 1.7% 10% 1.2%
Single 1992 5468 32% 0.6% 23% 0.6% 12% 0.4% 33% 0.6%
Dependant 1994 5594 35% 0.6% 19% 0.5% 12% 0.4% 33% 0.6%
1996 5598 34% 0.6% 18% 0.5% 11% 0.4% 37% 0.6%
Distribution of Agents Across Employment Sectors
 by Year and Family Structure Group
NMPWSF WSI SLF
 






Although the share of male workers who participate in the market is much bigger, the 
change in the sectoral composition of employment, as a whole, is similar to that of 
females. In 1992, 43% of male agents belong to the formal sector, fraction that increases 
to 45% in 1996. On the other hand, the proportion of male workers in the WSI sector 
decreases from 19% in 1992 to 16% in 1996, and the corresponding share in the SLF 
sector drops from 22% in 1992 to 20% in 1996. Finally, males’ non market participation 
increases from 15% in 1992 to 18% in 1996, mostly due to higher unemployment. 
The patterns of how the sectoral composition of employment varies for males and 
females, in the aggregate, also hold for most family structure groups. Table 2 shows that 
in 1992 married women, especially those with children, are the demographic groups with 
the highest fraction of non-market participants and the lowest proportion of salaried 
formal and informal workers. After the reform the proportion of formal workers increases 
by 4 percentage points, whereas the fraction of salaried informal and self-employed 
workers decreases by 2 and 3 percentage points, respectively.  Single head-of-household 
women stand out as the group with the highest proportion of market participants among 
women. Nevertheless, after the reform the proportion of self-employed decreases by 2 
percentage points, coupled to an increase of the same magnitude in non-market 
participation and no change in the fraction of salaried formal and informal workers. 
Finally, for single dependent women formality increases by 4 percentage points between 
1992 and 1996, while employment in the three remaining sectors decreases by 1 
percentage point each.  
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Regarding males, Table 2 shows that married men, with and without children, have 
the highest proportion of formal and self-employed workers, each with approximately 
50% and 28% respectively employed in these two sectors in 1992. After the reform; 
however, formality and non-market participation increase by 2 percentage points each, 
and salaried informality and self employment decrease by the same amount. Single head-
of-household men experience a 6 percentage point increase in formal employment after 
the reform, the highest change overall, coupled to a 3 percentage point reduction in both 
salaried informality and self employment and no change in the proportion of non-market 
participants. Finally, single dependent males experience a 2 percentage point increase in 
formality, but also a 4 percentage point increase in non-market participation, mostly 
compensated by a 5 percentage point reduction in salaried informality. 
 
1.5 Estimation Strategy and Results 
 
My goal in this chapter is to identify the effect of the 1993 Colombian social security 
reform on the employment sector choice of workers and evaluate how it varies according 
to their valuation of the benefits. Although I cannot measure this valuation directly, I 
believe that the gender, headship, parenthood, and marital status of the worker are good 
proxies for this valuation. I expect women to have a higher valuation of social security 
benefits than men given their higher degree of risk aversion. I expect single head-of-
household workers to have the highest valuation of both pension and health care benefits. 
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I anticipate this because they are the most risk averse group of them all12, under the new 
health care system they are able to cover their dependants, and as heads-of-household are 
less likely to be beneficiaries of someone else’s insurance. The group that should come 
second in terms of their valuation of the benefits is married workers with children, 
followed closely by married workers without children. I predict married workers should 
have a lower valuation of the benefits than single head-of-household workers because 
they are less risk averse13, and they are more likely to rely on family systems as a form of 
insurance. I expect childless couples to have a lower valuation of the benefits than those 
with children since they have fewer dependants to cover.  Finally, I anticipate single 
dependant workers to have the lowest valuation of both pension and heath care benefits, 
given that they can be a beneficiary of someone else’s insurance, are younger, and are 
less risk averse than the other demographic groups14. 
My estimation strategy consists on categorizing agents by their family structure type 
and evaluating for each category how the probability of belonging to a given employment 
sector changes from before to during and after the reform. As previously mentioned, 
however, the year 1992 is a year of economic contraction while 1994 and 1996 are years 
of economic expansion that precede the big recession the country experienced in 1999. 
The previous literature on informality in Colombia has found that the formal sector 
exhibits a pro-cyclical behavior expanding during periods of economic growth (Florez 
2002). Hence, it is important to control for the business cycle in order to single out the 
 




effect of the reform.  To do so, I include in my estimation sample an earlier period that is 
similar in terms of the cycle but did not experience a reform that altered the sectoral 
composition of employment. As seen in figure 2, this period corresponds to the years 
1984, 1986 and 1988. The year 1990 is not included in the sample due to data availability 
and because it is a period of deep structural transformations that affected the labor 
market. For this reason the years prior to 1990 are included only to control for the 
business cycle, but not as reference periods to measure the effect of the reform.   
The following Multinomial Logit model of the probability that a worker belongs to 
any of the four employment sectors is estimated separately for ten demographic 
categories defined by the gender and family structure of the agent:15 
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iYβ
WSF WSI SLF NMP
'
0 1 2 3 4 5P[ | , ] [ ( ) ]i i i i i i i ie X d X d d X Rξ β β β β β= = Λ + + + × + +   (8) 
Where ( , , , )ξ ∈ i, X  is a set of individual specific covariates that 
includes: marital status, headship status, age and its square, total number of people in the 
household, the proportion of employed and unemployed in the household, number of kids 
under age 6, and a set of dummy variables that control for education, whether the person 
is studying, migration status, and geographical location. The business cycle variables are 
the deviation of real GDP from trend, , and its interactions with the city and skill level 
variables, ( . In addition, 
id
)i id X× iR  is a dummy variable that equals 1 during the 1992-
                                                 
15 I use Eicker White Standard Errors to Account for common random effects at the city sector level. 
 
1996 period and zero otherwise and aims to control for the structural changes that 
occurred in Colombia in 1990.  
Finally, is a vector of year dummies for 1994 and 1996 whose coefficients measure 
the effect of the social security reform on the agents’ employment sector choice. The 
coefficient for the 1994 dummy measures mostly the effect of the pension reorganization, 
while the coefficient for the 1996 dummy represents the aggregate effect of the pension 
and health care reforms. It is important to point out, however, that the coefficient for the 
1994 dummy identifies the effect of the pension reform only if the health care 
reorganization that followed was not anticipated by the agents. If the workers anticipated 
the future changes in the health care system and reacted to them before they were actually 
implemented, I can only identify the cumulative effect of both reforms and its timing 
during the reorganization period. 
iY
The Table 1.a in the Appendix shows the Wald test of significance of the coefficients 
across equations for each family structure group considered. The upper panel shows the 
individual significance test and the bottom panel presents the joint test of significance for 
groups of variables. For females as a whole all the coefficients are statistically significant 
at a five percent level, whereas in the regression that includes all males in the sample the 
coefficient of the dummy variable that controls for the 1990 reform is not statistically 
significant. The same coefficient is not statistically significant for single dependent 




                                                
considered the variables that control for age, education, migration, expenditure unit and 
the business cycle are jointly statistically significant. 
The multinomial logit model makes the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA), which implies that adding another alternative or changing the 
characteristics of alternatives does not affect the relative odds between any two 
alternatives. In some circumstances this hypothesis might be too strong, thus I check it by 
implementing the Hausman and McFadden (1984) test. As shown in Table 2.a in the 
Appendix, the test fails to reject the IIA assumption across all gender and family structure 
groups; except when considering all females in the sample and the formal sector 
alternative is omitted from their choice set. These results are consistent with the IIA 
assumption. Furthermore, a Wald test for combining outcome categories rejects the 
hypothesis that any of the employment sector alternatives can be combined.16  
Table 3 characterizes the cumulative impact of the social security reform on 
employment sector choice for each of the reference groups considered.  In addition, 
Figure 3 shows the separate effects of the pension and health care reforms on females’ 
sectoral choice, and Figure 4 shows the corresponding results for males. Recall that the 
figures shown for the 1996-1992 period quantify the cumulative effect of both reforms, 
that the figures for the 1994-1992 period mostly measure the impact of the pension 
reform, and that the difference between these two give the estimates for the 1996-1994 
period that mainly represent the impact of the health care reorganization. 
 
16 The results of the Wald test for combining outcome categories are available on request. 
 
Table 3 
Females 1992 1994 1994-1992 1996 1996-1992
All Pr(y=WSF|x): 27.8% 30.5% 2.7% 1.6% 3.8% 33.5% 5.7% 3.9% 7.6%
Pr(y=WSI|x): 4.6% 3.9% -0.6% -1.0% -0.3% 3.6% -0.9% -1.3% -0.6%
Pr(y=SLF|x): 10.0% 9.1% -0.9% -1.4% -0.4% 7.7% -2.3% -2.8% -1.9%
Pr(y=NMP|x): 57.6% 56.5% -1.1% -2.4% 0.1% 55.2% -2.5% -3.9% -1.0%
Married Pr(y=WSF|x): 30.0% 32.4% 2.4% 0.1% 4.7% 36.8% 6.8% 4.3% 9.3%
No Pr(y=WSI|x): 4.2% 3.2% -1.0% -1.4% -0.5% 2.8% -1.5% -1.8% -1.1%
Children Pr(y=SLF|x): 11.1% 10.8% -0.3% -1.6% 1.0% 8.8% -2.3% -2.9% -1.8%
Pr(y=NMP|x): 54.7% 53.5% -1.2% -3.4% 1.1% 51.7% -3.0% -5.4% -0.6%
Married Pr(y=WSF|x): 16.9% 17.5% 0.6% -1.9% 3.0% 23.3% 6.4% 3.2% 9.7%
Children Pr(y=WSI|x): 3.5% 2.2% -1.3% -1.7% -1.0% 2.0% -1.5% -2.0% -1.0%
Pr(y=SLF|x): 6.8% 5.7% -1.1% -2.0% -0.3% 5.2% -1.7% -2.4% -1.0%
Pr(y=NMP|x): 72.8% 74.7% 1.9% -1.3% 5.0% 69.6% -3.3% -7.2% 0.6%
Single Pr(y=WSF|x): 79.9% 85.7% 5.8% 3.9% 7.8% 86.4% 6.5% 3.8% 9.3%
Head Pr(y=WSI|x): 9.0% 5.9% -3.1% -5.3% -0.9% 6.3% -2.7% -5.4% 0.1%
Pr(y=SLF|x): 8.4% 6.0% -2.3% -4.2% -0.4% 5.0% -3.4% -5.1% -1.7%
Pr(y=NMP|x): 2.7% 2.3% -0.4% -1.1% 0.3% 2.2% -0.5% -1.2% 0.3%
Single Pr(y=WSF|x): 42.4% 47.1% 4.8% 1.2% 8.3% 48.3% 5.9% 2.2% 9.6%
Dependant Pr(y=WSI|x): 12.9% 11.7% -1.1% -3.5% 1.3% 10.9% -2.0% -4.8% 0.9%
Pr(y=SLF|x): 4.1% 3.0% -1.1% -1.5% -0.7% 2.7% -1.4% -1.8% -1.0%
Pr(y=NMP|x): 40.7% 38.1% -2.6% -6.2% 1.1% 38.2% -2.5% -5.8% 0.8%
Males
All Pr(y=WSF|x): 64.6% 65.6% 1.0% -2.1% 4.1% 67.7% 3.1% 1.6% 4.6%
Pr(y=WSI|x): 12.4% 10.4% -2.0% -3.3% -0.6% 9.7% -2.6% -3.6% -1.6%
Pr(y=SLF|x): 21.5% 22.6% 1.1% -0.9% 3.0% 20.8% -0.7% -2.5% 1.1%
Pr(y=NMP|x): 1.6% 1.4% -0.1% -0.2% 0.0% 1.8% 0.2% 0.0% 0.4%
Married Pr(y=WSF|x): 64.8% 63.7% -1.1% -5.4% 3.2% 67.2% 2.4% -2.0% 6.7%
No Pr(y=WSI|x): 6.6% 6.0% -0.7% -1.9% 0.6% 4.9% -1.8% -2.2% -1.3%
Children Pr(y=SLF|x): 25.5% 27.5% 2.0% -1.2% 5.1% 24.4% -1.1% -4.6% 2.3%
Pr(y=NMP|x): 3.1% 2.8% -0.2% -0.5% 0.1% 3.6% 0.5% -0.6% 1.6%
Married Pr(y=WSF|x): 64.4% 65.8% 1.4% -0.5% 3.3% 68.2% 3.8% 1.3% 6.3%
Children Pr(y=WSI|x): 12.2% 10.6% -1.7% -2.9% -0.5% 10.2% -2.1% -3.5% -0.7%
Pr(y=SLF|x): 22.9% 23.2% 0.4% -0.8% 1.6% 21.0% -1.8% -3.7% 0.1%
Pr(y=NMP|x): 0.5% 0.4% -0.1% -0.2% 0.0% 0.6% 0.1% -0.1% 0.3%
Single Pr(y=WSF|x): 56.7% 56.9% 0.3% -7.4% 7.9% 59.5% 2.8% -1.2% 6.8%
Head Pr(y=WSI|x): 11.2% 8.2% -3.1% -4.5% -1.7% 6.9% -4.4% -6.8% -1.9%
Pr(y=SLF|x): 30.9% 33.9% 3.0% -4.7% 10.8% 32.8% 1.9% -3.2% 6.9%
Pr(y=NMP|x): 1.2% 1.0% -0.2% -1.2% 0.7% 0.8% -0.4% -1.1% 0.3%
Single Pr(y=WSF|x): 49.4% 53.0% 3.6% -1.5% 8.7% 51.5% 2.0% -2.1% 6.1%
Dependant Pr(y=WSI|x): 19.1% 15.7% -3.4% -6.2% -0.6% 15.4% -3.7% -6.0% -1.4%
Pr(y=SLF|x): 10.8% 10.9% 0.1% -2.3% 2.5% 10.4% -0.4% -2.0% 1.1%
Pr(y=NMP|x): 20.7% 20.4% -0.3% -1.4% 0.8% 22.8% 2.1% 0.3% 3.8%
Confidence intervals by delta method
95% CI 95% CI
Effect of Social Security Contributions on Employment Sector Choice
 




                                                
When considering all women in the sample, Table 3 shows that the reform generates 
a 6 percentage point increase in formality, a 2.5 percentage point reduction in the 
probability of both non-market participation and self employment, and a mere 1 
percentage point decline in salaried informality. Regarding males, Table 3 shows that the 
reform increases males’ formal employment probability by 3 percentage points, reduces 
salaried informality by 2.5 percentage points, decreases self-employment by 0.7 
percentage points, and has an insignificant effect on non-market participation. 
Analyzing these results within the framework of the equalizing differences model of 
employment choice introduced in section 1.3, I conclude that the overall effect of the 
higher valuation of benefits dominates the effect of the augmented contributions. 
Furthermore, the lager positive effect on formality observed for women than for men 
reflects a greater valuation of social security benefits by females and their higher degree 
of risk aversion. This last fact is documented in a number of financial studies that confirm 
that women are more risk averse than men, even after controlling for the effects of other 
individual characteristics.17 In addition, there is evidence that suggests that women tend 
towards lesser risk taking in labor markets than men, and are paid a higher compensating 
wage differential for accepting a given job-injury risk.18 
Another possible source of the greater effect of the pension reform on female wages 
is the seemingly preferential treatment they receive. Women might have a higher 
valuation of the benefits received through the pension system due to their lower 
 
17 See Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (1996) for a review of the literature on gender differences in risk taking that 
pays particular attention to risk taking and investing for retirement. 
18 Hersch  (1998), Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), Deleire and Levy (2004) 
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retirement age and longer life expectancy.19  It is important to clarify, however, that this 
may possibly be only the product of a poor understanding of how their pension benefits 
are computed.  As Uribe (2002) points out, a factor rarely know by the workers is that 
due to their lower wages and years contributing to the system, women will be penalized 
in the individual capitalization system where the benefits at the time of retirement are a 
function of the savings made and the life expectancy of the worker.  
The effect of the reform also differs according to the family structure group 
considered. Table 3 and Figure 3 show that for married women, with and without 
children, the impact of the health care reform is much bigger than that of the pension 
reform. For example, almost all of the 6.4 percentage point increase in formality for 
married women with children is explained by the health care reform. On the other hand, 
for single head-of-household and single dependent females the effect of the pension 
reform is much bigger than that of the health care reform. For single females, regardless 
of the headship status, the pension reform increases the probability of formal employment 
by about 5 percentage points, whereas the health care reorganization increases formality 
by only 1 percentage point. These results indicate that married women value more the 
health care than the pension benefits, while the opposite occurs for single women. 
Figure 3 and Table 3 show that married women, with and without children, are the 
family structure groups that experience the largest effects among women. They illustrate 
that the 6.8 percentage point increase in formality for married women without children 
 
19 The estimated life expectancy in the country is 69 years for men and 75 for women, while their 
retirement age is 60 and 55 years for men and women, respectively. 
 
comes with a reduction of about 2 percentage points in both self employment and non-
market participation during the second part of the reform, whereas for married women 
with children a similar increase in formality is coupled to a sharp 5 percentage point 
reduction in non-market participation. Moreover, the 5.8 percentage point increase in 
formal employment experienced by single head-of-household women after the pension 
reform is tied to a 3 and 2.5 percentage point reduction in salaried informality and self 
employment, respectively. The smoother increase in formality for single dependent 
women during the same period is joined by a 2.5 percentage point reduction in non-
market participation. 
Figure 3 
Effect of the Social Security Reform on Females' 
Employment Sector Choice  
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Similarly to what happens with women, Table 3 and Figure 4 show that the pension 
and health care reorganizations have a differential impact on the employment sector 
choice of males, depending on their marital and headship status. Nevertheless, it is 
important to point out that for all family structure groups considered, the magnitude of 
the effect of the reform on the probability of male formal employment is at least 2 
percentage points lower than that of females. This result highlights the lower valuation of 
social security benefits that men have relative to women. 
Figure 4 shows that the health care reform increases the probability of formal 
employment by 3 percentage points on average for all family structure groups, except for 
single male dependants. For this category formality decreases by 1.6 percentage points 
between 1994 and 1996, indicating that during this period the increase in the 
contributions is not offset by an increase in the valuation of the benefits. The effect of the 
health care reform on formality is lower for married men with children than for those 
without children, which signifies a relatively higher valuation of these benefits by the 
later demographic group. The effect of the pension reform, however, has the opposite 
pattern. For married men without children it reduces the probability of formal 
employment by 1 percentage point while for those with children it raises it by 1.5 
percentage points. Interestingly, single dependent males is the group of men that 
experiences the largest positive effect of the pension reform with an increase in the 
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There is also a marked differential effect of the pension and health care reforms on 
the informality of males. Both reforms reduce salaried informality for married and single 
men, regardless of their headship or parenthood status, but the effect of the pension 
reform is larger than that of the health care reorganization. This difference is more 
pronounced for single dependent men. For this group salaried informality decreases 
during the first part of the reform by 3.4 percentage points, whereas during the second 
part the effect is not statistically significant. In addition, the pension reorganization 
increases the probability of self employment for all family sector groups considered. The 




children, increasing self employment by 3 and 2 percentage points, correspondingly.  The 
health care modification counterbalances these effects, however, reducing self 
employment by 1 and 3 percentage points, respectively.  
As a final point, Figure 4 shows that the health care reform increases the non-market 
participation of single dependants, while it has an insignificant effect on the non-market 
participation of the other family structure groups. Furthermore, the pension reform does 
not have a significative impact on the market participation of any demographic categories 
considered.  
To summarize, these results indicate that, although the pension and health care 
reforms both generate an increase in formality in the aggregate, they have a differential 
impact on the sectoral composition of employment depending on the gender and family 
structure group considered. The overall effect of the reform is bigger for females than it is 
for males. Furthermore, the pension reorganization has a relative higher positive impact 
than the health care reform on the probability of formal employment for single workers, 
while the opposite occurs for married workers, regardless of the gender group considered.  
Among women, I find that for married women the health care reform is the basis for a 
transition from non-market participation and self employment into formality, especially 
for those with young children. On the other hand, for single head-of-household and single 
dependent women the pension reform is the major cause of the shift from salaried 
informality, self employment, and non-market participation into formality. Regarding 
males, the pension reform shifts employment from salaried informality into self 
 
38 
employment for single head-of-household men, and from salaried informality into 
formality for single dependants. Conversely, the health care reform reallocates married 
men from self employment into formality, and shifts single head-of household males 
from salary informality and self employment into formality. 
As previously mentioned, the differential effect of the social security reform across 
family structure groups reflects their different degrees of risk aversion. This statement is 
supported by two recent studies on risk aversion across demographic groups. A study by 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) that estimates relative risk aversion by gender and 
marital status in financial investment markets, finds that single men and married couples 
are relatively less risk averse than single women, which in the context of this chapter 
implies a lower valuation of the pension benefits by single men and married couples and 
therefore a lower positive effect of the pension reform on formality. In addition, a study 
by DeLeire and Levy (2004) that examines worker sorting across occupations in response 
to risk of dead on the job finds that single moms and single dads are more averse to risk 
than married men and women with children and people without children. Finally, 
concurring with my results, they find that the effect of parenthood for those who are 
married is much larger for women than for men. 
The patterns of how these effects vary across family structure groups are also 
consistent with the theoretical link between the magnitude of the impacts and the 
workers’ valuation of the social security benefits. The health reform replaced the existing 
affiliation system that covered only the worker, with one that covers also the spouse and 
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children or the parents of the worker. Consequently, after the reform, single dependent 
workers are able to get access to health care benefits through their parents, which 
attenuates their valuation of these benefits. For single dependent females this smoothes 
the increase in formality, whereas for single dependent males it generates a reduction in 
formal employment. On the other hand, married and single head-of-household women, 
especially those with young children, are now able to cover their dependants, which 
strengthen their valuation of health care benefits. Consequently, these are the 
demographic groups where the probability of formal employment increases the most. 
The previous findings on employment are theoretically consistent with the equalizing 
differences model of employment choice presented in Section 1.3, corresponding to the 
case where the effect of the higher valuation of social security benefits and the tighter 





This chapter analyzed the relationship between social security taxes and the choice of 
employment sector in Colombia. I departed from previous literature by examining the 
effect of a benefit-linked payroll tax, differentiating between the separate impacts of 
pension and health care contributions, investigating how the effects vary according to the 
workers valuation of the benefits, and considering the heterogeneity of the informal 
sector in developing countries.  I estimated a multinomial logit model of the probability 
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that a worker belongs to any of the following employment sectors: formal, wage-and-
salaried informal, self employment, and non-market participation. I used as a natural 
experiment the Colombian social security reform of 1993, which transformed the 
institutional framework for pension funds and health care provisions and provides a large 
exogenous variation that allows me to identify the effect of the contributions.  
  After controlling for the business cycle I find that, in the aggregate, a 10 percentage 
point increase in social security contributions accompanied by an improvement in the 
quality and quantity of the benefits, generates a 6 percentage point increase in the formal 
employment of females, a 2.5 percentage point reduction in both self employment and 
non-market participation, and a 1 percentage point fall in salaried informality. On the 
other hand, the reform increases males’ formal employment probability by only 3 
percentage points, reduces salaried informality by 2.5 percentage points, decreases self-
employment by 0.7 percentage points, and has an insignificant effect on males’ non-
market participation. 
These results disagree with the early time series and cross-sectional literature on 
payroll taxes and entrepreneurship that frequently conclude that higher income or general 
payroll tax rates generate higher levels of self employment because of the higher 
incentives for tax evasion. My contrasting results highlight the important role played by 
the link between benefits and contributions and the worker valuation of the benefits. 
Overall, my results are theoretically consistent with a model of employment sector 
choice, corresponding to the case where the effect of the higher valuation of social 
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security benefits dominates the impact of the augmented contributions. Furthermore, the 
patterns of how these estimated effects vary across family structure groups are consistent 
with the theoretical link between the magnitude of the effects and the agent’s valuation of 
the social security benefits. 
However, the theoretical model presented in Section 1.3 cannot help me to interpret 
what is happening within the informal sector. Consequently, an extension to the model to 
take into account four economic sectors and a binding minimum wage in the wage-and-
salary formal sector, would improve the understanding of the effects of payroll taxes on 















                                                




The theory of compensating differentials predicts that, under full valuation of the 
benefits, workers who receive more generous fringe benefits are paid a lower wage than 
comparable workers who receive fewer fringe benefits, all else being equal. 
Consequently, an increase in a benefit-linked payroll tax will result in lower wages but no 
change in the level of employment. In this chapter, I estimate the fraction of social 
security contributions that is transferred to workers in the form of lower wages, and how 
it varies according to the workers valuation of the benefits, using as a natural experiment 
the Colombian social security reform of 1993.  
The end of the 1980’s and early 1990’s was a period of deep structural 
transformations in Latin America. These reforms were part of efforts to liberalize 
economies and increase the participation of the market in the production and allocation of 
goods and services, and were the product of the collapse most economies experienced 
during the 1980’s due to their mounting fiscal and monetary imbalances.20  In Colombia 
the main reforms during this period included the approval of a new constitution, key 
reforms to the labor market, a major trade reform, and liberalization in direct foreign 
investment.  
Three years after these reforms were put in place Colombia implemented a social 
security reorganization that transformed the institutional framework for pension funds 
 
20 Heckman and Pages (2003). 
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and health care provision (Law 100 of December 1993). Regarding the health care 
regime, the social security reform replaced the existing discretionary affiliation system 
that covered only the worker, by a mandatory one that features a stricter prepayment 
system and covers also the spouse and children, or the parents of the worker. On the 
subject of pensions, the reform introduced a fully funded social security system giving 
workers the choice between the traditional benefit defined in the existing pay-as-you-go 
system, and the new one of individual capitalization of public funds. The greater benefits 
also brought along an increase in employees and employers’ pension and health care 
contributions, raising the payroll tax rate by over 10 percentage points.  
There is a large amount of work on the effects of the trade and labor reforms on the 
Colombian labor market. The literature on the social security reform, however, has 
focused on its overall economic effects, with only one study dealing with its labor market 
implications. Kugler and Kugler (2003) analyze the effect of the reform on wages and 
employment using a panel of manufacturing plants in Colombia for the 1982-1996 
period. Their estimates indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in payroll taxes 
reduces wages between 1.4% and 2.3%, and employment between 4% and 5%. 
Nevertheless, their firm-level data only provide information on the average wage and tax 
rate, do not allow controlling for individual demographic characteristics, and only 
measure the aggregate effect on the manufacturing sector.  
The differences-in-differences estimation approach I follow in this chapter uses the 
partial compliance with the regulation and the gradual rise in social security contributions 
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generated by the Colombian reform to estimate the effect of the contributions on wages 
and how it varies according to the workers valuation of the benefits. Although I cannot 
measure this valuation directly, I believe that marital and headship status and the 
presence of young children in the household are good proxies for this valuation. 
Consequently, I estimate the effects of the social security reform by categorizing agents 
according to their family structure type and comparing, within each category, the hourly 
wage of those with social security benefits to the hourly wage of those without benefits, 
and evaluating how they changed from before to after the reform.  The findings of this 
chapter have important policy implications for they reveal who would pay for an 
expansion in social security benefits, or an extension in its coverage. 
My results show that a 10 percentage point increase in payroll taxes, accompanied by 
an improvement in the quality and quantity of the benefits, reduce the hourly wages of 
female workers with access to social security benefits by 5% relative to the hourly wages 
of those without access to the benefits. On the other hand, I find that the hourly earnings 
of male workers in the wage-and-salary formal sector increase by 2% relative to the 
earnings of those in the wage-and-salary informal sector. Among females, the impact is 
greater for married mothers and single head-of-household females, whereas it is not 
significantly different from zero for single dependent women and married women 
without young children. Among men, the effect is not statistically significant for any of 
the family structure groups considered.  The patterns of how these estimated effects vary 
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across demographic groups are consistent with the theoretical link between the magnitude 
of the effects and the workers’ valuation of the social security benefits. 
This chapter is structured by presenting in the next section a review of the empirical 
and theoretical literature on the effects of social security contributions on wages. Section 
2.3 lays out the empirical identification approach. Section 2.4 presents the data and 
descriptive statistics.  Section 2.5 presents the results and section 2.6 summarizes and 
concludes.  
 
2.2 Literature on the Effects of Social Security Contributions on Wages 
 
Theoretically, social security contributions are considered a benefit-linked payroll tax 
because of the connection between the taxes paid by or on behalf of each worker and that 
individual’s expected benefits. Hence, with the presence of tax-benefits linkages workers 
receive a higher compensation, and the contributions are analogous to a price paid for a 
privately supplied commodity (Summers 1989). A general payroll tax, on the other hand, 
has no linkage to benefits for the individual taxpayer and therefore carries efficiency 
costs.  The benefit linkages of social security contributions depend on the extent to which 
workers perceive that they are getting them back as benefits and how much the individual 
values those benefits. This depends in turn on the quality of the services offered by the 
entities financed by the tax. If they are perceived as good, employees will consider the 
contributions as a deferred compensation or insurance program, and will accept a 
reduction in the net wage with no employment effects. If they are perceived as bad, the 
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contributions will be considered as a pure tax with the corresponding effects on 
employment. Additionally, as mentioned by Gruber (1997), a key determinant of tax-
benefits linkages is the extent to which the benefits are provided to both contributors and 
non-contributors, in the sense that if equal benefits are extended to the non-contributors 
for free, or at a highly subsidized rate, it will mitigate any tax benefits linkages for 
workers.  In most real-world social security systems, the link between contributions and 
benefits is ambiguous because the benefits financed by payroll taxes are not exactly 
accrued by employees. Hence, contributions to social security programs often contain an 
element of pure taxation in concert with elements of deferred compensation or insurance 
program. 
Gruber (1997) develops the standard model to analyze the wage effects of social 
security contributions. He uses a partial equilibrium model of the labor market with 
benefit-linked payroll taxes levied on both employers and employees.  In that model an 
increase in the employer’s contributions drives wages down, while an increase in the 
employees’ contributions drives wages up. The final effect on wages will be the net result 
of these two forces, which depends on the elasticities of demand and supply, and the 
extent to which employees discount their payroll tax payments and value employers’ 
payments relative to cash income. Gruber (1998) points out three scenarios under which 
increased employer’s social security contributions are fully transferred on to lower 
wages.  One possibility is a very tight tax-benefit linkage where workers also value the 
benefits at their full cost. In that case contributions would be like a price paid for a 
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privately supplied commodity. Another case is a perfectly inelastic labor supply, and a 
third scenario is a perfectly elastic labor demand. If labor demand is not perfectly elastic, 
or labor supply is not perfectly inelastic, and there exist a divergence between taxes paid 
and benefits accrued, then a pure tax effect arises and only part of the higher payroll taxes 
will be transferred to lower wages. In such a case, the greater the elasticity of demand 
comparatively to the elasticity of supply, and the higher the valuation of the benefits 
received in exchange, the greater the effect of social security contributions on wages. 
Although a great number of the empirical literature on the effect of social security 
reforms on wages has focused on Latin America, given that it is a region that experienced 
a series of large and exogenous social security reforms during the last two decades, 21  
there is also a great deal of related literature that focuses on the labor market effects of 
mandated employer-provided benefits in the United States.   
One of the first empirical studies on the labor market effects of payroll taxation is 
Hamermesh (1979). Using data from the PSID he examines the degree to which workers’ 
earnings are affected by the share of the tax paid by employers. He finds that 15-35% of 
any increase in the payroll tax is shifted by employers on to labor and that this occurs 
mostly within the first year after a tax increase becomes effective. Later on, however, 
Gruber and Krueger (1991) using Current Population Survey (CPS) data find that higher 
employers’ cost of workers compensation insurance are largely shifted to employees in 
 
21 In general, these reforms changed the rate of payroll taxes and affected the relationship between social 
security contributions and benefits, which had substantial effects on the region’s labor market. See 
Heckman and Pages (2003) for a detailed survey of the literature on the cost of regulation in Latin America, 
which includes the cost of social security contributions. 
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the form of lower wages and do not have a statistically significant effect on employment. 
Subsequently, Gruber (1994) uses a differences-in-differences approach to analyze the 
effect of state and federal laws that mandated comprehensive coverage for childbirth in 
private health insurance policies; regulation that exogenously increased the cost of 
employing women of childbearing age and their husbands. The mandated tax differed 
across states at a point in time and within states over time, which allow him to control for 
time-series trends, fixed state differences in wages, and state specific shocks that are 
correlated with the passage of the laws. He uses data from the CPS and finds that all the 
costs generated by the law are shifted to the wages of the target group with no effect on 
the net labor supply of that group. 
Afterward, Gruber (1997) studies the wage effect of the Chilean social security 
reform of 1981 that exogenously reduced average payroll tax rates by 25%, and 
strengthened its benefit linkage. He uses data from a census of manufacturing firms to 
model the change in wages at a given plant as a function of the calculated average tax 
rate. He further controls for measurement error in the tax and wage bills, and finds that 
the reduction in the payroll tax burden of Chilean firms increased wages by the same 
amount, indicating full transfer of taxes to wages with little effect on the level of 
employment.  Given these results he concludes that there is generally little efficiency cost 
from financing employee benefits through payroll taxation. 
Contrary to what happened in Chile, in Colombia the payroll tax reform raised the 
contributions by 10.5 percentage points. It is interesting to compare the incidence of the 
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reforms in both countries given that, if wages are flexible upward but not downward, 
there could be full shifting to wages as a result of a reduction in payroll taxes but not as a 
result of an increase.  Kugler and Kugler (2003) address this issue using a panel of 
manufacturing plants in the formal sector in Colombia for the period 1982-1996. They 
follow the estimation approach of Gruber (1997) by constructing tax rates for each plant 
and controlling for measurement error in the tax and wage bills. Their estimates indicate 
that a 10 percentage points increase in payroll taxes reduces formal wages between 1.4% 
and 2.3% and formal employment between 4% and 5%. They explain this partial transfer 
to wages as a result of the weak bond between benefits and contributions and downward 
rigidities in wages due to the presence of a binding minimum wage. Kugler and Kugler 
(2003) also find less shifting and more unemployment effect for production than for non-
production workers, which they explained by the fact that the minimum wage is more 
likely to be binding for the former group of workers.   
It is important to point out that Gruber (1997) and Kugler and Kugler (2003) firm-
level data only provide information on the average wage and tax rate, do not allow 
controlling for individual demographic characteristics, and only measure the aggregate 
effect of the reform on the manufacturing sector. By using the Colombian National 
Household Survey data set, I consider a broad set of economic activities and occupations, 




                                                
In particular, the chapter at hand contributes to the literature by estimating how the 
effect of social security contributions on wages varies according to the workers valuation 
of the benefits. Although I cannot measure this valuation directly, I believe that marital 
and headship status and the presence of young children in the household are good proxies 
for this valuation.22 The differences-in-differences approach I follow in this chapter also 
utilizes the gradual increase in the contributions generated by the reform and the fact that 
informal employment, or employment that does not comply with the social security 
regulations, has traditionally been a large component of total employment in Colombia. 
Consequently, I analyze the effect of the social security reform by categorizing agents 
according to their family structure type and evaluating for each category how the wage 
differential between formal and informal sectors varies from before to during and after 
the reform.   
 
2.3 Empirical Specification 
 
Closely related to the literature on the effect of social security reforms on the labor 
market, there exists a considerable amount work dealing with the estimation of the impact 
of health insurance on wages.  Currie and Madrian (1999) provide a good survey of this 
literature and point out that one of the biggest concerns facing this area of research is an 
issue of identification, for it is difficult to distinguish between the effects of health 
 
22 DeLeire and Levy (2004) use a similar strategy in their study of working sorting across occupations in 
response to the risk of death on the job. 
 
insurance and the effects of other variables that are correlated with both health insurance 
and wages. 
Suppose that SSi =1 is an indicator of whether or not person i receives social security 
benefits through his/her job. In addition, denote Wi(1) the wage they have if they work in 
the formal sector and Wi(0) if they work in the informal sector. Holding everything else 
constant, the difference Wi(1) - Wi(0) is the causal effect of belonging to the formal 
sector on their wage. A common assumption in the literature is that the fact that person i 
belongs to the formal sector does not affect any other person. Under this scenario we can 





1( )i i iLog W X SSβ α ξ= + +         (9) 
Equation (9) is a Mincerian wage equation that regresses the log of real hourly wages 
against a vector of traditional determinants of real wages, X.  If X fully captures all the 
factors that affect wages other than the social security benefits, then 
^
α  will be an 
unbiased estimate of the net effect of firm and workers’ social security contributions on 
wages. The coefficient can be interpreted as a compensating wage differential for social 
security. If the employees value the benefits obtained through employer provided social 
security at their full cost, the workers are going to perceive the contributions as a 
payment for the received services and will accept a reduction in their wage compensation, 
and therefore 
^
α  will be negative.  If there is only a partial valuation of the benefits, the 
 
magnitude and sign of the coefficient will depend on the elasticities of supply and 
demand, the employee’s valuation of the benefits, and the statutory burden of the tax.23   
Unfortunately, the econometrician rarely observes all the non-social security related 
factors that affect wages.  In this case the error term 1iξ  in equation (9) contains all these 
omitted variables. If social security availability is correlated with these unobserved 
characteristics, then the bias of α
∧
 in the OLS estimation of equation (9) is given by: 






δα α θ− =      (10) 
Where iδ  is the vector of unobserved individual characteristics such as ability or 
productivity, and θ  is the effect of this unobserved characteristic on wages.  
If the effect of the unobserved characteristic on wages is positive ( 0θ > ), and 
workers with high level of ability/productivity look for higher compensation both in 
wages and social security benefits ( cov( ) 0i iSS δ > ), then 
^
α  will be positively biased, 
masking any tradeoff that the employees are willing to make to get access to social 
security benefits. Because of this problem, most of the empirical literature has found that 
the estimated wage differential for health insurance tends to be positive, contrary to what 
the theory of compensating differential predicts. 24 
Nevertheless, if this bias is constant for all years in the sample, one can use a 
differences-in-differences estimation approach to difference out the omitted variable bias. 
                                                 
23 The reduce-form estimation approach does not allow sorting out either the structural sources of the wage 
change, or distinguishing the effects of employers and employees’ social security contributions. 
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24 See Currie and Madrian (1999), Olson (2002), MaCurdy and Rapoport (2003) 
 
25 That is, by comparing the effect of social security contributions on wages from before 
to after the Colombian reform; I can eliminate the bias due to unobserved heterogeneity 
and leave only the effect of the increase in social security contributions on wages. This 
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Where  is the real hourly wage,  iW iX  is a vector of traditional determinants of real 
wages comprising: education, experience, experience square, tenure, marital status, 
headship status, an indicator of whether the person is studying, the presence of kids under 
age 6, geographical location, migration status,  occupation, industry, kind of contract, 
firm’s size, and place of work. The business cycle variables are the deviation of real GDP 
from its trend, , and its interactions with the city, industry, occupation, tenure and skill 
level variables, . In addition,  is a dummy equal to 1 if worker  receives 
social security benefits through his/her job, is a vector of year dummies for 1994 and 
1996, and 
id
( i id X× ) iS i
iY
iR  is a dummy variable that equals 1 during the 1992-1996 period and zero 
otherwise and aims to control for the structural changes that occurred in Colombia in 
1990. I also include the interaction ( i iS d )×  to control for sector specific cyclical effects, 
and the interaction (  to control for sector specific effects of the 1990 reforms.  )
                                                
i iS R×
 











The coefficients of interest are given by the interactions of the social security dummy 
with the year fixed effects, , which capture the effect of the social security reform 
on wages. The coefficient for the 1994 interaction measures mostly the effect of the 
pension reorganization, while the coefficient for the 1996 interaction represents the 
aggregate effect of the pension and health care reforms. It is important to point out, 
however, that the coefficient for the 1994 interaction identifies the effect of the pension 
reform only if the health care reorganization that followed was not anticipated by the 
agents. If the agents anticipated the future changes in the health care system and reacted 
to them before they were actually implemented, then I can only identify the cumulative 
effect of both reforms and its timing during the reorganization period. 
( i iS Y×
This identification approach is similar to the one used by Kugler (2000) in her study 
of the incidence of job security regulations on the Colombian labor market. She uses the 
temporal change in the legislation introduced by the labor market reform of 1990, 
together with the regulation’s coverage disparity, to control for self-selection and the 
difference in shocks across groups. However, she points out that this methodology only 
allows her to identify a lower bound for her parameter of interest.  
Finally, to investigate how the valuation of the benefits affects the estimates of the 
impact of the reform, I define four family structure categories per gender group that I 
expect to vary on this valuation. These categories are: married agents with and without 
children, single head-of-household workers, and single dependants. I expect single head-
of-household workers to have the highest valuation of both pension and health care 
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benefits. I anticipate this because they are the most risk averse group of them all26, under 
the new health care system they are able to cover their dependants, and as heads-of-
household are less likely to be beneficiaries of someone else’s insurance. The group that 
should come second in terms of their valuation of the benefits is married workers with 
children, followed closely by married workers without children. I predict married 
workers should have a lower valuation of the benefits than single head-of-household 
workers because they are less risk averse27, and they are more likely to rely on family 
systems as a form of insurance. I expect childless couples to have a lower valuation of the 
benefits than those with children since they have fewer dependants to cover.  Finally, I 
anticipate single dependant workers to have the lowest valuation of both pension and 
heath care benefits, given that they can be a beneficiary of someone else’s insurance, are 
younger, and are less risk averse than the other demographic groups28. 
 
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data I use for the estimation are the June waves of the Colombian National 
Household Survey for the years 1984, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, and 1996. The year 1990 
is not included in the sample due to data availability and because it is a period of deep 
structural transformations that affected the labor market.29 The survey is a cross section 
administered in the ten most important metropolitan areas in the country. I use the June 
 
26 Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), Deleire & Levy (2004) 
27 Ibid 
28 Ibid 
29 These changes include the approval of a new constitution, key reforms to the labor market, a major trade 
reform, and the liberalization in direct foreign investment. 
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waves because every two years they include a special module on informality that has 
information on whether the individual receives social security benefits through his/her 
job. As seen in Figure 2, the year 1992 is a year of economic contraction while 1994 and 
1996 are years of economic expansion that precede the big recession the country 
experienced in 1999.30 Hence, it is important to control for the business cycle in order 
identify the effect of the 1993 social security reform on wages. To do so, I include in my 
estimation sample an earlier period that is similar in terms of the cycle but did not 
experience any reform that affected the labor market. The corresponding control period 
comprises the years 1984, 1986 and 1988. 
I make use of the availability of health social security benefits through the job, the 
individual’s employment status, and his/her occupation to sort workers into three 
employment sectors. I classify agents in the wage-and-salary formal sector (WSF) if they 
work as a salaried or domestic service worker and have access to social security benefits 
through their jobs, and I categorize agents in the wage-and-salary informal sector (WSI) 
if they have a salaried job that does not provide health care social security benefits. I use 
only the availability of health benefits to classify workers into sectors because the 
question regarding the affiliation to the pension system only appears in the survey after 
1996. However, these two measures are highly correlated. Before the reform the 
affiliations to health and pensions perfectly coincide since the public Social Security 
Institute managed both of them. The 1993 reform introduced different private insurance 
 
30 I estimated the business cycle using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter with lambda=6.25 
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administrators for the health and pension part of the system altering this match, however. 
In 1996 for example, 56% of the workers has access to health care benefits, while only 
47% has access to pension benefits. The higher coverage the health social security has, 
relative to its pension counterpart, is explained by the fact that the law requires proof of 
affiliation to the health care regime in order to affiliate a worker to the pension part of the 
system, but not the other way around. 
Previous studies of the informal sector in Colombia, that use a different 
characterization of the informal sector based on firm size, have found that more than 50% 
of the total working population belong to this sector, comprised mainly by the self-
employed, unpaid family workers, domestic service, salaried workers employed in small 
firms, and micro enterprise owners. According to the official figures of the Colombian 
National Department of Statistics, in 1992 informal employment represented 54% of total 
urban employment, proportion that decreased to 52.3% in 1996. 
In my estimation sample, however, I include only prime age salaried workers that are 
employed full-time in the private sector. I exclude self-employed workers because their 
earnings reports have large measurement errors given that they confound salary with the 
returns from capital investments and the earnings of unpaid family workers. I exclude 
government employees because they receive fringe benefits obtained in collective 
conventions of labor, and some of them, such as the military, the teachers, and the 
Colombian Oil Company’s employees, have their own social security entities that are 
unaltered by the reform. In addition, I exclude female workers over 55 years of age and 
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male workers over 60 years of age in view of the fact that they are beyond the legal 
retirement age in Colombia. My final sample has on average 8.900 men and 5.500 
women per year. 
In this resulting sample, a higher fraction of the working population belongs to the 
formal sector, and this fraction increases after the reform. Table 4 shows that formal 
employment among females augmented from 60% in 1992 to 66% in 1996, while 
formality rose from 49% to 54% among male workers. Table 4 also shows that the 
increase in formality holds across almost all family structure groups considered. 
The increase in salaried formality might be explained by the higher benefits and 
stronger tax-benefit linkages brought along by the reform, which increased the incentives 
to comply with the regulation for workers with high valuation of those benefits. 
Furthermore, the reform introduced special insurance promoter institutions whose main 
goal is to promote enrollment and hire the services of providers for the case of health, or 
promote enrollment and manage the funds collected for the case of pensions. An evidence 
of these factors is the rise in the proportion of workers enrolled in the pension system, 
which went from 23% in 1993 to 40% in 1996, with almost all the increase explained by 
new affiliations to the individual capitalization system managed by the private insurance 
promoter institutions.31  
The differences-in-differences estimation approach basically compares the wage 
differential between the formal and the informal sectors from before to during and after 
 
31 Asofondos (2001) 
 
the reform. Consequently, it is important to identify the job and demographic 
characteristics of these sectors and how they changed over time. Regarding the 
demographic characteristics, Table 5 shows that, in 1992, formal sector workers are on 
average older, with 31 years of age for females and 33 years of age for males, compared 
to salaried informal workers with average ages of 29 and 30 years for females and males, 
respectively. Although the average age increases for both employment sectors after the 
reform, the increase is higher in the formal sector, which widens the age gap.  
 
Table 4 
Structure Sector mean  s.e. mean  s.e. mean  s.e. mean  s.e. mean  s.e. mean  s.e. 
 WSF 60% 0.6% 63% 0.6% 66% 0.6% 49% 0.5% 51% 0.4% 54% 0.5%
 WSI 25% 0.5% 22% 0.5% 21% 0.5% 26% 0.4% 24% 0.4% 23% 0.4%
 SLF 14% 0.4% 15% 0.4% 13% 0.4% 25% 0.4% 26% 0.4% 23% 0.4%
 WSF 58% 1.4% 60% 1.3% 65% 1.3% 50% 0.8% 49% 0.8% 55% 0.8%
 WSI 22% 1.1% 17% 1.0% 15% 0.9% 18% 0.6% 18% 0.6% 15% 0.6%
 SLF 21% 1.1% 23% 1.1% 20% 1.1% 32% 0.8% 33% 0.8% 30% 0.7%
 WSF 58% 1.6% 63% 1.6% 67% 1.5% 49% 0.9% 49% 0.8% 53% 0.9%
 WSI 23% 1.4% 17% 1.2% 18% 1.2% 23% 0.7% 23% 0.7% 23% 0.7%
 SLF 20% 1.3% 20% 1.3% 15% 1.2% 28% 0.8% 29% 0.8% 25% 0.8%
 WSF 21% 2.6% 18% 2.1% 22% 2.3% 25% 2.4% 21% 2.1% 20% 2.1%
 WSI 67% 3.0% 69% 2.6% 66% 2.6% 48% 2.8% 53% 2.6% 56% 2.6%
 SLF 12% 2.1% 13% 1.9% 12% 1.8% 26% 2.4% 26% 2.3% 25% 2.3%
 WSF 72% 1.1% 74% 1.1% 75% 1.1% 52% 1.0% 56% 1.0% 56% 1.0%
 WSI 22% 1.1% 21% 1.0% 21% 1.0% 35% 0.9% 30% 0.9% 31% 0.9%










Distribution of Agents Across Employment Sectors
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WSF= Formal; WSI= Informal; SLF= Self employment 
 
There is a positive relationship between the level of schooling and formality. As 
shown in Table 5, the formal sector is more skill intensive with 3 more years of schooling 




that the skill level increases in all sectors after the reform, which maintains the skill gap 
constant for men, but narrows it for women. The differences in the average age and 
schooling attainment across employment sectors reproduce in differences in the average 
potential experience. Table 5 shows that males in the wage-and-salary formal sector have 
the highest potential experience with an average of 18.3 years, followed by salaried 
informal males and females with 17.6 years and 16.2 years of experience, 
correspondingly. The average experience across sectors does not change significatively 
after the reform.  Only for females in the formal sector the potential experience increases 
by 1 year, which reduces the gap with the salaried informal sector.  Finally, Table 5 
shows that formal workers also have the highest tenure with an average of 2.6 years, 
while salaried informal workers have only an average of 2 years of tenure. These figures 
stay roughly constant over the period of study. 
On the subject of job’s characteristics, Table 5 shows that, before the reform, 90% of 
women and 77% of men in the formal sector worked in a fix place such as a factory or an 
office, while only 60% of the workers in the salaried-informal sector did.  After the 
reform, however, the proportion of salaried informal women that work in a fixed place 
increases by 7 percentage points, while the corresponding fraction for women in the 
formal sector decreases 3 percentage points. Finally, firms in the formal sector are bigger 
with an average of 3.5 employees, one more than the firms in the wage-and-salary 
informal sector. As seen in Table 7, these numbers remained rather stable after the 
reform. The above figures reflect that most of the firms in the informal sector have to 
 
restrict their size and location in order to avoid detection and maintain their informal 
status. In fact, 60% of the firms in the salaried-informal sector have 5 workers or less. 
Table 5 
mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e. 
WSF 31.0 0.1 31.6 0.1 32.0 0.1 33.3 0.1 33.0 0.1 34.0 0.1
WSI 29.3 0.2 29.6 0.2 29.7 0.2 30.6 0.2 30.9 0.2 30.9 0.2
WSF 9.8 0.1 9.9 0.1 10.0 0.1 8.9 0.1 9.1 0.0 9.2 0.0
WSI 7.1 0.1 7.5 0.1 7.7 0.1 7.0 0.1 7.0 0.1 7.2 0.1
WSF 15.1 0.2 15.7 0.2 16.0 0.2 18.3 0.2 17.9 0.1 18.7 0.1
WSI 16.2 0.2 16.1 0.3 16.0 0.3 17.6 0.2 17.9 0.2 17.7 0.2
WSF 2.5 0.0 2.5 0.0 2.6 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.6 0.0 2.7 0.0
WSI 1.9 0.0 1.9 0.0 2.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 2.1 0.0 2.1 0.0
WSF 3.5 0.0 3.4 0.0 3.4 0.0 3.5 0.0 3.5 0.0 3.4 0.0
WSI 2.4 0.0 2.4 0.0 2.5 0.0 2.8 0.0 2.9 0.0 2.8 0.0
WSF 0.90 0.01 0.88 0.01 0.87 0.01 0.77 0.01 0.77 0.01 0.73 0.01











Workers and Job Characteristics Across Sectors
Females Males
1992 1994 1996 1992
 
WSF=Wage-and-Salary Formal; WSI= Wage-and-Salary Informal. 
 
Table 6 shows an initial examination of the relationship between earnings and social 
security benefits across family structure groups. The comparison is made taking into 
account not only monetary income, but also an alternative measure of earnings that 
includes non-pecuniary retributions such as food or housing. The results are similar for 
both measures; hence, I only report the first one. I find that, before the reform, the mean 
real hourly wage is on average 44% higher for female workers covered by the social 
security than for females in the non-compliant sector. Men in the formal sector, on the 
other hand, earn just 29% more than their counterparts in the wage-and-salary informal 
61 
 
sector. These earning gaps narrowed through time, especially for women where both gaps 
decreased by 10 percentage points. 
     Table 6 
Log (W) mean se mean se mean se mean se mean se mean se
 WSF 7.17 0.01 7.22 0.01 7.23 0.01 7.27 0.01 7.33 0.01 7.33 0.01
 WSI 6.72 0.01 6.82 0.01 6.89 0.01 6.99 0.01 7.06 0.01 7.06 0.01
First Dif. 0.44 0.01 0.40 0.01 0.35 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.26 0.01 0.27 0.01
 WSF 7.27 0.02 7.26 0.02 7.24 0.02 7.35 0.01 7.43 0.01 7.39 0.01
 WSI 6.86 0.03 6.88 0.03 6.98 0.03 7.08 0.02 7.13 0.02 7.14 0.02
First Dif. 0.40 0.03 0.38 0.03 0.26 0.03 0.27 0.02 0.29 0.02 0.25 0.02
 WSF 7.23 0.02 7.26 0.02 7.27 0.02 7.29 0.01 7.33 0.01 7.34 0.01
 WSI 6.76 0.03 6.88 0.03 6.98 0.04 7.01 0.02 7.12 0.02 7.11 0.02
First Dif. 0.47 0.04 0.37 0.03 0.30 0.04 0.27 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.23 0.02
 WSF 7.28 0.04 7.30 0.04 7.25 0.04 7.31 0.04 7.33 0.04 7.40 0.04
 WSI 6.88 0.07 6.90 0.05 6.92 0.04 7.00 0.04 7.10 0.05 7.14 0.05
First Dif. 0.40 0.08 0.39 0.06 0.34 0.05 0.31 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.26 0.06
 WSF 7.19 0.01 7.27 0.01 7.31 0.01 7.18 0.01 7.24 0.01 7.27 0.01
 WSI 6.82 0.02 6.94 0.02 6.97 0.02 6.89 0.01 6.97 0.01 7.01 0.01








Wage Differential Across Family Structure Groups
Males 






WSF=Wage-and-Salary Formal; WSI= Wage-and-Salary Informal. 
 
The wage differential, although always positive, varies across family structure groups 
throughout the sample period. Married women with children are the group with the 
highest wage differential, followed by single head-of-household women, married women 
without children, and single dependent women, in that order. This sorting, however, is 
reversed among males, where single dependent men have some of the highest wage 




                                                
     As mentioned in section 2.3, the positive association between wages and social 
security benefits highlight the role of self-selection into sectors according to the 
unobserved productivity or ability of the worker.  Workers with high demand for social 
security benefits also have high levels of ability/productivity that will influence their 
compensation, making the coefficient of the formal sector dummy in equation (9) 
positively biased, and masking any tradeoff that the employees are willing to make to get 
access to social security benefits. 
 
2.5  Results of the Differences-in-differences Estimation. 
 
Table 7 shows the OLS estimation of equation (11) for males and females, using 
Eicker White robust standard errors to account for common random effects at the sector 
level.32  The differences-in-differences equation regresses the log of the hourly real wage 
on a constant, education, experience, experience square, tenure, marital status, headship 
status, indicators of whether the person is studying, the presence of kids under age 6, 
geographical location, migration status, industry, occupation, kind of contract, firm’s 
size, place of work, the availability of social security benefits, a set of business cycle 
variables, a dummy for the post 1990 period, a vector of year dummies for 1994 and 
 
32 This regression was run including and excluding self-employed workers from the estimation sample. The 
estimated effect of the reform on the wage differential between the wage-and-salary formal and informal 
sectors is not affected by the sample selection rule. However, the estimated effect of the reform on the 
earnings differential between the wage-and-salary informal and the self employment sectors is suspiciously 
large. As mentioned earlier, the earnings reports of self-employed workers have large measurement errors 
given that they confound salary with the returns from capital investment and the earnings of unpaid family 
workers. Furthermore, self-employed workers have high incentives to misreport earnings for tax evasion 
purposes. For all these reasons I do not present the estimates for the self employment sector in the results 
that follow.  
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1996, and interactions of the social security dummy with the business cycle and post 
1990 dummy that controls for sector specific effects of the business cycle and the 1990 
reforms. Finally, the coefficients that measure the effect of the pension and health care 
reforms on wages are those of the interactions of the social security dummy with the 
1994 and 1996 year dummies. 
To illustrate the effect of including controls on the differences-in-differences 
estimation, I added them gradually to the regression equation. Column 1 in Table 7 
includes no controls; column 2 controls for demographic characteristics; column 3 adds 
controls for occupation and industry fixed effects and so forth. Each cell contains the 
OLS coefficient and standard errors of the differences-in-differences estimation of the 
effect of social security contributions on wages. On each panel, the first two rows 
compare the wage gap between sectors for the years 1996 and 1994 to the corresponding 
difference in wages in 1992, and measure the net effect of the increment in social security 
contributions on the relative wages of formal sector workers. In addition, row 3 shows the 
effect of the 1990 reforms on the wage differential and row 4 shows the time invariant 
effect of social security contributions on wages. Finally, rows 5, 6, and 7 show the time 
series changes on wages and the effects of the 1990 reforms that are common to both 
sectors.  
First of all, it is important to notice that contrary to the predictions of the 
compensating differential theory, the estimate of the time invariant effect of social 
security on wages in row 4 is positive for all specifications, confirming the existence of 
 
an omitted variable bias. Note also that the bias declines with more detailed controls. 
Furthermore, note that gradually adding controls to equation (11) also reduces the 
differences-in-differences coefficients that measure the effect of the 1993 reform. 
Table 7 
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5Females 1 2 3 4
WSF x Year96 -0.100 -0.089 -0.072 -0.056 -0.046
0.000 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.008
WSF x Year94 -0.047 -0.048 -0.042 -0.035 -0.027
0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
WSF x Post 1990 -0.124 -0.117 -0.103 -0.084 -0.092
0.000 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.004
WSF 0.566 0.345 0.276 0.179 0.180
0.000 0.013 0.019 0.011 0.010
year94 0.101 0.098 0.091 0.091 0.183
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
year96 0.164 0.132 0.125 0.115 0.233
0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002
Post 1990 0.102 0.012 0.014 0.009 -0.070
0.000 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.005
Males
WSF x Year96 -0.016 -0.011 -0.009 -0.001 0.024
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.007
WSF x Year94 -0.025 -0.012 -0.009 -0.002 0.019
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
WSF x Post 1990 0.004 -0.023 -0.027 -0.016 -0.030
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002
WSF 0.284 0.149 0.144 0.093 0.091
0.000 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007
year94 0.078 0.063 0.061 0.058 0.153
0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003
year96 0.077 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.177
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003
Post 1990 -0.024 -0.052 -0.049 -0.055 -0.139
0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005
Controls
Demographic Characteristics N Y Y Y Y
Occupation & Industry N N Y Y Y
Job Characteristics N N N Y Y
Business Cycle N N N N Y
Difference in Difference Estimation
Effect of Social Security of Wages
 




Column 5 is the specification that contains the full set of controls, thus is the one that 
I discuss in more detail. In this regression the omitted category are unskilled married 
head-of-household workers who have a rural origin, are not attending school, and work 
without social security benefits in the service sector at firms that have only one employee 
and no fixed location. 
The differences-in-differences coefficients as well as most of the coefficients for 
demographic, industry, city, occupation and firm characteristics are statistically different 
from zero and have the expected signs. Furthermore, the variables that control for 
cyclical effects at the sector, city, industry, occupation, tenure, and skill level also have 
jointly statistically significant coefficients.  
As previously mentioned, during the first part of the reform the increase in payroll 
taxes is mainly due to pensions, whereas during the second part is mostly explained by 
higher health care contributions. However, I can isolate the effect of the pension reform 
only if the health care reorganization that followed was not anticipated by the agents. If 
the agents anticipated the future changes in the health care system and reacted to them 
before they were actually implemented, I can only identify the cumulative effect of both 
reforms and its timing during the reorganization period. 
For females, the differences-in-differences coefficient for the year 1994 tell us that 
during the first part of the reform, a period of time during which social security 
contributions increase by 4.5 percentage points, there is a significant 2.7% drop in the 
wages of women in the formal sector of the economy relative to the wages of those in the 
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informal sector. By the year 1996 social security contributions rise by 10.5 percentage 
points and the corresponding differences-in-differences coefficient increases to 4.6%. 
This implies that, when considering all females in the sample, about half of the higher 
contributions are passed on to formal workers as lower wages. The effect of the social 
security reorganization is the opposite for males; however, with a 2.4% relative increase 
in the wages of men in the formal sector that occurs mostly during the first part of the 
reform. As mentioned before, the effect of the higher contributions on wages depends 
partly on the extent to which employees discount their payroll tax payments and value 
employers’ payments relative to cash income. Consequently, a higher valuation of the 
benefits by females explains why employers are able to transfer half of the increased 
social security contributions to females and none to male workers.  
Two possible explanations of the differential valuation of the benefits are that women 
are more risk averse than men and that they face a higher probability of being 
unemployed. The first factor is documented in a number of financial studies that confirm 
that women are more risk averse than men, even after controlling for the effects of other 
individual characteristics.33 Furthermore, there is evidence that suggests that women tend 
towards lesser risk taking in labor markets than men, and are paid a higher compensating 
wage differential for accepting a given job-injury risk.34 Regarding the second factor, 
during 1994-1996 period the unemployment rate for women is more than 5 percentage 
 
33 See Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (1996) for a review of the literature on gender differences in risk taking that 
pays particular attention to risk taking and investing for retirement. 
34 Hersch  (1998), Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), Deleire and Levy (2004) 
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points higher than that for men, explained by an increase in the participation rate of 
women.35  
A third possible source of the greater effect of the pension reform on female wages is 
the seemingly preferential treatment they receive. Women might have a higher valuation 
of the benefits received through the pension system due to their lower retirement age and 
longer life expectancy.36 It is important to clarify, however, that this may possibly be 
only the product of a poor understanding of how their pension benefits are computed.  As 
Uribe (2002) points out, a factor rarely known by the workers is that due to their lower 
wages and years contributing to the system, women will be penalized in the individual 
capitalization system where the benefits at the time of retirement are a function of the 
savings made and the life expectancy of the worker. 
It is important to mention that the greater effect on female wages diverges from the 
findings of Mondino and Montoya (2000), who estimate hedonic wage functions using 
Argentinean PHS data for the 1990-1996 period. They find that male workers in the 
formal sector earn 8% less than their counterparts in the informal sector, while female 
workers sacrifice only 2.8% to get a job in the formal sector.37 However, they fail to 
correct for unobserved heterogeneity, and their results depend heavily on their parametric 
assumption about the sample selectivity.  
 
35 According to the Colombian National Department of Statistics the average unemployment rate for the 
1994-1996 period is 10%. The participation rate of women is still lower than that of men. 
36 The estimated life expectancy in the country is 69 years for men and 75 for women, while their 
retirement age is 60 and 55 years for men and women, respectively. 
37 The later coefficient is not statistically different from zero. 
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I also investigate how variations on the valuation of the benefits across family 
structure groups affect the estimates of the effect of the reform. Table 8 shows the results 
of the separate estimation of equation (11) for married workers with and without children, 
single head-of-household workers, and single dependants.  
Married mothers and single head-of-household women are the demographic 
categories that experience the largest effects. For both of these groups the relative wages 
decrease by 10.5% between 1992 and 1996, which implies a full transfer of the higher 
contributions in the form of lower wages. For married mothers the effect occurs mostly 
during the first part of the reform, while for single head-of household women the effect is 
equally spread throughout the reform period. On the other hand, the relative wages of 
married women without children in the formal sector increase by 6% during the first part 
of the reform, but decrease by 5% during the second part, for a cumulative effect that is 
not significantly different form zero. Similarly, for single dependent females formal 
wages decrease by 5% between 1992 and 1994, but this effect is counterbalanced by a 
2% increase between 1994 and 1996, for a cumulative effect that is not statically 
significant. Although of a smaller magnitude than women, married fathers and single 
head-of-household males are also the groups that experience the largest effects among 
men, with a 1.5% reduction in the wages of individuals in the formal sector relative to the 
wages of those in the informal sector.  The effect, however, is not statistically significant 





WSF x Year96 -0.046 ** 0.007 -0.105 ** -0.105 * -0.029
0.008 0.004 0.016 0.030 0.017
WSF x Year94 -0.027 ** 0.058 *** -0.096 ** -0.048 -0.048 **
0.003 0.005 0.013 0.040 0.008
WSF x Post 1990 -0.092 *** -0.090 ** -0.025 -0.005 -0.009
0.004 0.012 0.009 0.039 0.007
WSF 0.180 *** 0.146 ** 0.155 *** 0.147 ** 0.122 ***
0.010 0.021 0.007 0.021 0.010
WSF x GDP 0.515 -3.354 *** 2.163 ** 3.398 -0.183
0.381 0.308 0.226 1.390 0.592
year94 0.183 *** 0.060 *** 0.221 *** 0.258 ** 0.216 ***
0.003 0.003 0.009 0.029 0.004
year96 0.233 *** 0.127 *** 0.270 *** 0.311 *** 0.223 ***
0.002 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.009
Post 1990 -0.070 *** -0.069 -0.132 *** -0.162 ** -0.143 ***
0.005 0.007 0.009 0.021 0.004
Males
WSF x Year96 0.024 * 0.001 -0.015 -0.013 0.001 **
0.007 0.013 0.013 0.022 0.000
WSF x Year94 0.019 ** 0.020 -0.012 0.009 0.016 **
0.002 0.007 0.007 0.029 0.003
WSF x Post 1990 -0.030 *** 0.000 -0.003 -0.049 -0.020 **
0.002 0.002 0.007 0.024 0.004
WSF 0.091 *** 0.092 *** 0.084 *** 0.062 ** 0.085 **
0.007 0.005 0.007 0.013 0.015
WSF x GDP 0.079 1.096 * 0.850 * -2.331 ** -0.925
0.078 0.329 0.264 0.281 0.346
year94 0.153 *** 0.152 *** 0.208 *** 0.181 ** 0.124 ***
0.003 0.004 0.006 0.021 0.004
year96 0.177 *** 0.173 *** 0.253 *** 0.285 *** 0.165 ***
0.003 0.004 0.007 0.021 0.007
Post 1990 -0.139 *** -0.164 *** -0.192 *** -0.148 ** -0.113 ***
0.005 0.002 0.007 0.021 0.006











  WSF=Wage-and-Salary Formal dummy; * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
I find similar patterns of the effects across family structure groups in the next chapter, 
where I examine the effect of social security contributions on hours worked. My results 




sector by 2 hours relative to the weekly hours worked by those in the informal sector of 
the economy. Similar to the wages results, the effect is particularly important among 
married mothers and single head-of-household women, whereas for married women 
without children, single dependent women, and men in any family structure group the 
effect is not statistically significant. 
The effects of the social security reorganization on wages and hours worked are also 
connected to the effect of the reform on the employment sector choice of workers. In the 
previous chapter I find that, among females, the reform generates a 6 percentage point 
increase in the proportion formal workers, a 2.5 percentage point reduction in both self-
employment and non-market participation, and a 1 percentage point fall in salaried 
informality. On the other hand, the reform increases males’ formal employment 
probability by only 3 percentage points, reduces salaried informality by 2.5 percentage 
points, decreases self-employment by 0.7 percentage points, and has an insignificant 
effect on males’ non-market participation. Among females, my results show that for 
married women the reform is the basis for a transition from non-market participation and 
self employment into formality, especially for those with young children. Conversely, for 
single head-of-household and single dependent women the reform causes, in addition to 
the previous changes, a shift from salaried informality into formality.  
As previously mentioned, the differential effect of the social security reform across 
family structure groups reflects their different degrees of risk aversion. This statement is 
supported by a study by Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998). They use data from the U.S. 
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Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (1989) to estimate relative risk aversion 
by gender in financial investment markets and  find that single men and married couples 
are relatively less risk averse than single women. Therefore, I expect single women to 
have the highest valuation of the benefits of them all.  Furthermore, a recent study by 
DeLeire and Levy (2004) that examines worker sorting across occupations in response to 
risk of dead on the job, finds that single moms and single dads are more averse to risk 
than married men and women with children and people without children. They also find, 
similar to what I find here, that the effect of parenthood for those who are married is 
much larger for women than for men.  
The patterns of how these effects vary across family structure groups are also 
consistent with the theoretical link between the magnitude of the impacts and the 
workers’ valuation of the social security benefits. The health reform replaced the existing 
affiliation system that covered only the worker, with one that covers also the spouse and 
children or the parents of the worker. Consequently, after the reform, single dependent 
workers are able to get access to health care benefits through their parents, which 
attenuate their valuation of these benefits. For single dependent females, this smoothes 
the increase in formality with the corresponding small reduction in the relative wages of 
formal sector workers. For single dependent males, it generates a reduction in formal 
employment and an associated increase in the relative wages of those in the compliant 
sector of the economy. On the other hand, married and single head-of-household women, 
especially those with young children, are now able to cover their dependants, which 
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strengthen their valuation of health care benefits. Consequently, they are the demographic 
groups that give up a higher fraction of their wages in order to get access to the social 
security benefits and, consequently, the groups where the probability of formal 
employment increases the most. 
The previous findings on employment and wages are theoretically consistent with a 
theoretical model of employment sector choice presented in Section 1.3, corresponding to 
the case where the effect of the higher valuation of social security benefits and the tighter 





In December of 1993 Colombia implemented a Social Security reorganization that 
transformed the institutional framework for pension funds and health care provision. The 
reform not only meant an increase in the contributions, but also an improvement in the 
quality of the benefits and an increase in the contribution-benefit linkage. The theory of 
compensating differentials predicts that, under full valuation of the benefits, an increase 
in a benefit-linked payroll tax will result in lower wages but no change in the level 
employment. In this chapter, I estimate the effect of social security contributions on 
wages and how it varies according to the workers valuation of the benefits. To do this, I 
employ a differences-in-differences approach that exploits the exogenous increase in the 
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contributions generated by the reform and the existence of a large fraction of employment 
in Colombia that does not comply with the social security regulation. 
Given that social security availability is correlated with individual characteristics 
unobserved by the econometrician, such as ability or productivity, the OLS estimates of 
the effect of social security on wages are positively biased. Consequently, the literature 
has regularly found positive estimates of the effect of social security on wages, which 
contradict the predictions of the compensating differential theory. Nevertheless, if the 
correlation between the unobserved individual characteristics and the availability of 
social security benefits is constant for all the years in the sample, then, by comparing the 
effect of social security on wages for two different years one could eliminate the bias and 
leave only the effect of the augmented social security contributions on wages.  
My results show that a 10.5 percentage point increase in payroll taxes, accompanied 
by an improvement in the quality and quantity of the benefits, reduce the hourly wages of 
female workers with access to social security benefits by 5% relative to the hourly wages 
of those without access to the benefits. On the other hand, the hourly earnings of male 
workers in the wage-and-salary formal sector increase by 2% relative to the earnings of 
those in the wage-and-salary informal sector. Among females, the impact is greater for 
married mothers and single head-of-household females, whereas it is not significantly 
different from zero for single dependent women and married women without young 
children. Among men, the effect is not statistically significant for any of the family 
structure groups considered.  The patterns of how these estimated effects vary across 
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demographic groups are consistent with the theoretical link between the magnitude of the 
effects and the workers’ valuation of the social security benefits. These findings have 
important policy implications for they reveal who would pay for an expansion in social 
security benefits, or an extension in its coverage. 
An identification issue is present here, however. It could be the case that because of 
the tighter contribution-benefit linkage generated by the reform, more workers with high 
levels of ability and earnings look also for a higher compensation in social security 
benefits. If this happens, the unobserved ability bias increases with the reform and the 
differences-in-differences methodology used in this chapter only identifies the lower 
bound of the effect of social security on wages. 
Moreover, the work of Kugler (2000) highlights two assumptions that lie behind the 
identification strategy used in the differences-in-differences estimation.38 First, this 
procedure ignores the general equilibrium effects of the reform on the wages and 
composition of each sector, assuming that aggregate shocks affect both sectors equally. 
Second, it assumes that the composition of workers is constant over time. My findings in 
the previous chapter suggest that this is not the case.  Therefore, it is important to explore 





38 Marrufo (2001) 
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Chapter 3:  Hours of Work Effect of Social Security Contributions. 
  
3.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I contribute to the understanding of the relationship between social 
security and the structure of employment, by empirically examining the effect of pension 
and health care social security contributions on hours worked. I concentrate on prime age 
workers and investigate how variations on the valuation of the benefits across family 
structure groups affect the estimates. I use Colombia as a case study because the country 
implemented a social security reform in 1993 that transformed the institutional 
framework for pension funds and health care provisions.    
 Regarding the health care regime, the reform replaced the existing discretionary 
affiliation system that covered only the worker, with a mandatory one that features a 
stricter prepayment system and also covers the spouse and children or the parents of the 
worker. On the subject of pensions, the reform introduced a fully funded social security 
system, giving workers the choice between the traditional benefit defined in the existing 
pay-as-you-go scheme, and the new one of individual capitalization of public funds. The 
greater benefits also brought along an increase in employees and employers’ pension and 
health care contributions, raising the payroll tax rate by over 10 percentage points.39 
 To identify the effects of the contributions on the weekly hours of work, I follow 
a differences-in-differences estimation approach that uses the large exogenous change in 
the social security system and the fact that only a fraction of firms comply with the social 
 
39 For a more detailed description of the social security reform see Section 1.2. 
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security regulation. Specifically, I estimate the effects of the social security reform by 
categorizing agents according to their family structure type and comparing, within each 
category, the weekly hours worked by those with social security benefits to the hours 
worked by those without benefits, and evaluating how they changed from before to after 
the reform.  
I find that the social security reform has a negative effect on the hours of work of 
women in the formal or compliant sector of the economy, reducing their average weekly 
work by 2 hours relative to the weekly hours worked by those in the informal sector of 
the economy. The effect is particularly important among married mothers and single 
head-of-household women, whereas for married women without children, single 
dependent women, and men in any family structure group the effect is not statistically 
significant. The effect on women is mostly explained by a reduction in the proportion of 
females that work part-time in the informal sector, who switched to full-time jobs in the 
formal sector in order to get access to social security benefits for themselves and their 
families. This change in the composition of employment sectors increases the average 
hours worked in the non-compliant sector but does not increase the average hours of 
work in the formal sector.   
In the next section I present a brief discussion on the theoretical effects of social 
security contributions on hours of work. Section 3.3 presents the data and descriptive 
statistics. The empirical identification approach and the primary results are presented in 
section 3.4. Finally, section 3.5 provides a summary and concludes.  
 
3.2 Literature on the Effects of Social Security Contributions on Hours 
Worked  
 
 Although there is not much literature specifically on the effects of social security 
contributions on hours worked, there are a lot of studies dealing with the estimation of the 
impact of employer-provided health insurance on labor supply. This research has 
concentrated for the most part on the effects on the elderly, lower income single mothers, 
and married couples in the United States. See Gruber (1998), Currie & Madrian (1999), 
and Gruber & Madrian (2002) for a critical examination of this literature. The latest 
review, done by Gruber & Madrian (2002), concludes that there is clear evidence that 
health insurance is a key determinant of retirement decisions, not a major determinant on 
the labor supply and welfare exit decision of low income mothers, and an important 
factor in the labor supply decisions of secondary earners. 
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 To analyze the effect of these contributions on the Colombian labor market I 
consider a formal sector covered by social security regulations that coexists with an 
informal or unprotected sector that evades them, in an economy where wages are 
competitively determined. On the supply side, assume that the worker maximizes his 
utility U(C, L) that depends on market consumption goods (C) and Leisure (L), subject to 
an hourly wage rate (w) and total hours available (T). Define the pretax competitively 
determined wages in the formal and informal sectors as , respectively; the 
payroll tax on formal sector firms as
and Fw
ft ; and the tax rate on formal sector workers as , 
such that the total payroll tax equals to
et
e fT t t= + .   
 
 Pensions and health care social security contributions are a benefit-linked payroll 
tax given that there is a connection between the taxes paid by or on behalf of each worker 
and that individual’s expected benefits. Hence, with the presence of tax-benefits linkages 
workers receive a higher compensation, and the contributions are analogous to a price 
paid for a privately supplied commodity (Summers 1989). Therefore, access to health 
care and pension benefits constitute a lump-sum employment benefit that, if leisure is a 
normal good, may induce a negative income effect on desired hours of labor supply.  
 Nevertheless, Buchmueller and Valletta (1999), in their study of the effect of 
health insurance on married female labor supply in the United States, recognize that the 
effect may be more complex because there are only few part-time jobs that offer this kind 
of benefits. This is also true for the case of social security benefits in Colombia given that 
most formal sector firms do not hire part-time workers as salaried employees.40 
Consequently, most part-time employees work without employer-provided social security 
benefits while full-time employees can choose the employment sector at which his/her 
utility is maximized.  
 Panels A and B in Figure 5  show that individuals face the budget constraint a-b-
c-d if they work in the informal sector of the economy, regardless of the number of hours, 
where the slope of the constraint is given by , the pretax wage in the sector that does 
not comply with social security benefits.  On the other hand, workers face the constraint 
a-b-c-f-e if they switch to the sector that provides social security benefits once they 
Iw
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40 Formal sector firms hire most part-time workers as external contractors, who, as self-employees, must 




reached the minimum number of hours required to work in that sector, defined as HF. The 
slope in the segment e-f is given by Fw t− , the after tax  wage in the formal sector of the 
economy, while the slope in the segment b-c given by . Similar to Buchmueller and 
Valletta (1999) for the case of health insurance, the second constraint has a jump on the 
workers budget constraint at the full-time threshold, where the height of this jump, 
defined as 
Iw
(0, )iε ε∈ , depends on the extent to which employees value the access to 
social security benefits. If employee i  values the access to social security benefits, then 
0iε ≥ . On the other hand, if worker i  does not value the amenities received through 
social security, then 0iε = and such a jump on the budget constraint does not exist.  
 Panel A in Figure 5 shows the case of employees that would otherwise be 
working part-time without access to employer-provided social security benefits, but 
switch to work full-time in the formal sector to get access to the social security benefits 
for themselves and their families. Panel B in Figure 5 shows a different scenario, where 
individuals that were working full-time in the informal sector before the reform switch to 
work full-time in the formal sector due to the improved quantity and quality of the social 
security benefits. A third scenario, not depicted in Figure 5, is the case of individuals that 
were working full-time in the formal sector of the economy before the reform and stayed 
in that sector after the reform. In all three cases, I expect the improved benefits brought 
by the Colombia social security reform of 1993 to increase the concentration of hours 
worked at or near the legal full-time threshold in the sector that provides those benefits. 
Furthermore, I anticipate that the effect would be particularly important among married 
 
mothers and single head-of-household women given their high valuation of social 
security benefits, whereas for married women without children, single dependent women, 
and men in any family structure group the effect would not be significant.41 
 
Figure 5 
The Effect of Social Security Benefits on Hours of Work 
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 On the demand side, the theoretical effect of health and pension benefits on hours 
of work in Colombia differs from the impact in the United States. Health insurance in the 
United States is a quasi-fixed cost that varies with the number of workers rather than the 
number of hours (Oi 1962). Cutler and Madrian (1998), in their study of labor market 
 
41 The differences in the valuation of the benefits across family structure groups will be explained in more 





































responses to rising health insurance cost, develop a model that shows how an increase in 
the cost of health insurance, even if offset by wage reductions, will alter the trade off that 
firms face when allocating labor input between hours per worker and the numbers of 
employees hired. They state that “raising the fixed cost relative to marginal cost will lead 
firms to substitute hours for workers in allocating labor input”. Empirically, they find that 
the rapid growth in health insurance in the 1980s led to an increase in hours of work 
among workers who received employer-provided health insurance, while workers without 
employer-provided health insurance actually experience a reduction in hours worked. 
 Colombian social security taxes are computed as a percentage of monthly 
earnings. Consequently, an increase in social security contributions affects the per hour 
cost of labor, while it does not affect the fixed cost of hiring someone. The standard 
theory on the demand of hours and workers states that a higher per hour cost of labor 
leads firms to substitute increased number of workers for fewer hours per employee. 
Furthermore, if both inputs are normal, the scale effect due to the higher marginal cost of 
production induces a reduction in both hours and workers.  The final effect depends on 
the fraction of social security contributions that employers pass on to workers in the form 
of lower hourly wages, however. 
   In the second chapter I study the effect of social security contribution on wages 
and I find that a 10 percentage point increase in social security contributions, 
accompanied by an improvement in the quality and quantity of the benefits, reduces the 
hourly wages of female workers with access to social security benefits by 5% relative to 
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the wages of those without access to the benefits. On the other hand, I find that the hourly 
earnings of male workers in the wage-and-salary formal sector increase by 2% relative to 
the earnings of those in the wage-and-salary informal sector. Given that the higher social 
security contributions were not fully passed on to workers in the form of lower wages, I 
anticipate that the reform lead to a reduction in hours of work among workers who 
receive social security benefits, as compared to workers without social security benefits. 
 
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data I use for the estimation are the June waves of the Colombian National 
Household Survey for the years 1984, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, and 1996. The year 1990 
is not included in the sample due to data availability and because it is a period of deep 
structural transformations that affected the labor market.42 The survey is a cross section 
administered in the ten most important metropolitan areas in the country that, besides a 
complete set of demographic variables, has employment information including usual 
weekly hours worked. I use the June waves in particular because every two years they 
include a special module on informality that has information on whether the individual 
receives pension and health social security benefits through his/her job. 
The year 1992 is a period of economic contraction while 1994 and 1996 are years of 
economic expansion that precede the big recession the country experienced in 1999. 
Hence, it is important to control for the business cycle in order to identify the effect of the 
 
42 These changes include the approval of a new constitution, key reforms to the labor market, a major trade 
reform, and the liberalization in direct foreign investment. 
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1993 social security reform on hours worked. To do so, I include in my estimation 
sample an earlier period that is similar in terms of the cycle but did not experience any 
reform that affected the labor market. The corresponding control period comprises the 
years 1984, 1986 and 1988.43 
I use the availability of health social security benefits through the job, the individual’s 
employment status, and her occupation to sort workers into two employment sectors. I 
classify agents in the wage-and-salary formal sector (WSF) if they work as a salaried or 
domestic service worker, regardless of the number of hours, and have access to social 
security benefits through their jobs, and I categorize agents in the wage-and-salary 
informal sector (WSI) if they have a salaried job that does not provide health care social 
security benefits. I use only the availability of health benefits to classify workers into 
sectors because the question regarding the affiliation to the pension system only appears 
after 1996. 
In my estimation sample I include men aged 18-60 and women aged 18-55 who are 
salaried workers in the private sector. I exclude self-employed workers because their 
labor market decisions do not depend on the cost of benefits in the same way as do the 
hours worked of those employed by firms.44 I exclude government employees because 
they receive fringe benefits obtained in collective conventions of labor, and some of 
them, such as the military, the teachers, and the Colombian Oil Company’s employees, 
have their own social security entities that were unaltered by the reform. Finally, I 
 
43 See Figure 2 in Chapter 1. 
44 Cutler and Madrian (1998) 
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exclude female workers over 55 years of age and male workers over 60 years of age in 
view of the fact that they are beyond the legal retirement age in Colombia. My final 
sample has on average 9.300 men and 6.300 women per year.  
To investigate how the valuation of the benefits affects the estimates of the impact of 
the reform, I define four family structure categories per gender group that I expect to vary 
on this valuation. These categories are: married individuals with and without children, 
single head-of-household workers, and single dependants regardless of their parenthood 
status. I expect single head-of-household workers to have the highest valuation of both 
pension and health care benefits because previous studies have found that they are the 
most risk averse family structure group among the categories I consider in this study,45 
under the new health care system they are able to cover their dependants, and as heads-
of-household are less likely to be beneficiaries of someone else’s insurance. The group 
that comes second in terms of their valuation of the benefits is married workers with 
children, followed closely by married workers without children. I predict married 
workers should have a lower valuation of the benefits than single head-of-household 
workers because they are less risk averse,46 and they are more likely to rely on family 
systems as a form of insurance. I expect childless couples to have a lower valuation of the 
benefits than those with children since they have fewer dependants to cover.  Finally, I 
 
45 Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) estimate relative risk aversion by gender in financial investment 
markets and  find that single men and married couples are relatively less risk averse than single women. 
Furthermore, DeLeire and Levy (2004) examine worker sorting across occupations in response to risk of 
dead on the job, and find that single moms and single dads are more averse to risk than married men and 
women with children and people without children. They also find that the effect of parenthood for those 




                                                
anticipate single dependent workers to have the lowest valuation of both pension and 
heath care benefits, given that they can be a beneficiary of someone else’s insurance, are 
younger, and are less risk averse than the other demographic groups I consider in this 
study.47 
Table 9 shows the average weekly hours worked across employment sectors by 
gender and family structure group. Before the reform, female workers covered by the 
social security system work on average 46.6 hours per week, two hours more than 
females in the non-compliant sector. This gap narrowed through time, however. As Table 
9 shows, the 1.3 hours increase in the amount of time worked by women in the informal 
sector was no compensated by the small increase in the weekly hours worked by those in 
the formal sector. Men in the compliant sector, on the other hand, work 51 hours per 
week throughout the sample period, slightly less than their counterparts in the wage-and-
salary informal sector. 
The hours of work differential also varies across family structure groups. Among 
women, married mothers are the group with the highest hours’ differential between the 
formal and the informal sectors before the reform. However, they are also the group 
where the gap narrows the most, to a point that it becomes negative in 1996. On the other 
hand, married women without children are the only group where the gap increases after 
the reform, mostly due to a 1.5 hours increase in the weekly work of those with 





        Table 9 
Sector mean se mean se mean se mean se mean se mean se
WSF 46.6 0.2 46.2 0.2 47.1 0.2 50.9 0.1 51.0 0.1 51.2 0.1
WSI 44.6 0.4 44.1 0.4 45.9 0.4 50.9 0.2 51.8 0.2 51.3 0.2
First Dif. 2.0 0.4 2.2 0.4 1.2 0.4 -0.1 0.3 -0.7 0.3 -0.1 0.3
WSF 46.6 0.3 46.2 0.3 48.1 0.3 52.4 0.3 52.3 0.3 52.1 0.2
WSI 44.9 0.7 43.9 0.7 44.6 0.7 52.8 0.5 52.8 0.4 52.6 0.5
First Dif. 1.7 0.8 2.3 0.8 3.5 0.8 -0.4 0.5 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.5
WSF 46.5 0.4 46.1 0.4 46.5 0.3 51.9 0.2 52.5 0.3 52.6 0.3
WSI 43.7 0.8 42.5 0.9 47.2 0.9 53.6 0.4 53.9 0.4 53.1 0.4
First Dif. 2.8 0.8 3.6 1.0 -0.7 1.0 -1.7 0.5 -1.5 0.5 -0.5 0.5
WSF 48.5 0.7 47.8 0.6 49.1 0.6 50.3 0.9 50.6 0.7 51.6 0.8
WSI 47.0 1.7 48.6 1.7 48.2 1.1 49.8 1.2 50.4 1.5 49.9 1.1
First Dif. 1.5 1.8 -0.8 1.8 0.8 1.2 0.5 1.5 0.2 1.6 1.7 1.4
WSF 46.4 0.2 46.0 0.2 46.2 0.2 47.7 0.3 47.9 0.2 48.3 0.2
WSI 44.5 0.6 44.3 0.5 45.6 0.6 47.5 0.4 49.0 0.4 48.9 0.4










1992 1994 1996 1992




WSF=Wage-and-Salary Formal; WSI= Wage-and-Salary Informal. 
 
Among males, single head-of-household men are the only group that has a positive 
hours worked differential between the formal and the informal sector. Moreover, this gap 
increases after the reform. In contrast, married fathers in the informal sector work 1.7 
hours per week more than the corresponding group in the formal sector, but the 
differential decreases after the reform. Finally, it is important to point out that, across all 
family structure groups considered, informal sector employees have a higher variance of 
hours worked than formal workers.   
Table 10 compares the distribution of workers across thresholds of hours worked for 




not. As expected, there are very few jobs offering social security benefits that entail 
working fewer than 40 hours per week. Before the reform, 7% of females and 3% of 
males in the formal sector work part-time, whereas in the informal sector 21% of women 
and 9% of men do. This relationship holds across al family structure groups considered. 
After the reform, however, the proportion of part-time workers in the informal sector 
decreases across almost all demographic categories. In particular, the probability of part-
time informal employment decreases by 12 percentage points among married mothers 
and single head-of-household women.  In contrast, the proportion of agents working part-
time in the formal sector increases slightly after the reform for almost all demographic 
groups. The exceptions are single men, regardless of headship status, where this fraction 
decreases by 1.5 percentage points.  
 Regarding full-time employment, Table 10 shows that 71% of females and 64% 
of males in the formal sector work between 40 and 48 hours per week in 1992, compared 
to only 50% of men and women in the salaried informal sector. The higher share of full-
time workers in the formal sector holds across all family structure groups.  Nevertheless, 
Table 10 also shows that after the reform the fraction of full-time workers in the informal 
sector increases for all demographic types, especially among females. One exception is 





Females sector mean se mean se mean se mean se mean se mean se mean se mean se mean se
WSF 7% 0.4% 7% 0.4% 8% 0.4% _ 71% 0.7% 74% 0.7% 71% 0.7% 23% 0.7% 19% 0.6% 22% 0.6%
WSI 21% 0.9% 19% 0.9% 17% 0.9% 49% 1.1% 54% 1.2% 51% 1.2% 30% 1.0% 27% 1.0% 32% 1.1%
WSF 9% 1.0% 10% 1.0% 9% 0.9% 71% 1.6% 73% 1.5% 65% 1.5% 20% 1.4% 17% 1.3% 26% 1.4%
WSI 22% 2.1% 25% 2.4% 25% 2.5% 54% 2.6% 55% 2.7% 51% 2.9% 25% 2.2% 20% 2.2% 24% 2.5%
WSF 8% 1.1% 9% 1.1% 10% 1.1% 74% 1.8% 74% 1.7% 70% 1.7% 18% 1.6% 17% 1.5% 20% 1.5%
WSI 30% 2.7% 32% 3.1% 18% 2.5% 47% 2.9% 47% 3.3% 52% 3.3% 23% 2.5% 21% 2.7% 30% 3.0%
WSF 3% 1.4% 4% 1.3% 4% 1.3% 67% 3.8% 74% 2.9% 67% 3.2% 30% 3.7% 22% 2.7% 30% 3.1%
WSI 23% 5.1% 14% 4.2% 11% 3.3% 40% 5.9% 53% 6.1% 56% 5.2% 37% 5.8% 33% 5.7% 34% 5.0%
WSF 6% 0.7% 7% 0.7% 7% 0.7% 77% 1.2% 79% 1.1% 77% 1.2% 17% 1.1% 14% 1.0% 16% 1.0%
WSI 23% 1.9% 20% 1.9% 20% 1.9% 56% 2.3% 62% 2.3% 58% 2.4% 21% 1.8% 19% 1.8% 23% 2.0%
Males
WSF 3% 0.2% 3% 0.2% 3% 0.2% 64% 0.6% 66% 0.6% 63% 0.6% 34% 0.6% 32% 0.6% 34% 0.6%
WSI 9% 0.5% 6% 0.4% 8% 0.5% 51% 0.8% 55% 0.9% 52% 0.9% 39% 0.8% 39% 0.8% 40% 0.9%
WSF 2% 0.3% 2% 0.3% 3% 0.3% 59% 1.2% 61% 1.1% 60% 1.1% 39% 1.2% 37% 1.1% 37% 1.1%
WSI 7% 0.9% 5% 0.8% 7% 1.0% 48% 1.8% 52% 1.8% 48% 1.9% 45% 1.8% 43% 1.8% 44% 1.9%
WSF 2% 0.3% 2% 0.3% 3% 0.4% 59% 1.2% 61% 1.2% 58% 1.2% 39% 1.2% 38% 1.2% 40% 1.2%
WSI 6% 0.8% 4% 0.6% 5% 0.7% 47% 1.7% 50% 1.7% 49% 1.7% 48% 1.7% 47% 1.7% 46% 1.7%
WSF 5% 1.7% 4% 1.3% 3% 1.2% 65% 3.9% 66% 3.5% 64% 3.4% 31% 3.7% 30% 3.4% 33% 3.3%
WSI 9% 2.8% 7% 2.7% 5% 2.3% 46% 5.0% 62% 5.1% 51% 5.4% 46% 5.0% 31% 4.9% 44% 5.3%
WSF 6% 0.7% 4% 0.5% 5% 0.6% 73% 1.2% 76% 1.1% 73% 1.2% 22% 1.2% 20% 1.0% 23% 1.1%






















Distribution of Workers Across Thresholds of Hours Work by Family Structure Type




WSF=Wage-and-Salary Formal; WSI= Wage-and-Salary Informal. 
 
On the other hand, the share of males in the compliant sector working full-time stays 
somewhat stable throughout the sample period, regardless of the family structure group 
considered, whereas the corresponding fraction decreases by 4 and 5.6 percentage points 
for married women with and without children, respectively. 
Finally, Table 10 shows that there is a higher fraction of workers with overtime hours 
in the non-compliant sector of the economy compared to workers that receive social 
security benefits. Before the reform, 23% of women and 34% of men in the formal sector 
work more than 48 hours per week, whereas 30% and 39% of their respective 
counterparts in the informal sector do. Even though these aggregate proportions stay 
roughly constant after the reform, their patterns through time vary across family structure 
groups. The fraction of formal employees working overtime increases across almost all 
demographic categories, except for single dependent females and married men without 
children. Among informal workers, on the other hand, the corresponding share increases 
for married mothers and single dependent men and women, but decreases for the 
remaining family structure types. 
To summarize, there is a higher proportion of full-time workers in the formal than in 
the informal sector of the economy, whereas the informal sector has a higher fraction of 
part-time and overtime workers. After the reform, however,  the share of part-time 
workers in the formal sector increases slightly, whereas the informal sector experiences a 
significant reduction in the fraction of part-time workers and a corresponding increase in 
the share of full-time and overtime workers. These changes are particularly pronounced 
among married mothers and single head-of-household women.  Finally, it is important to 
point out that the low proportion of part-time workers in the formal sector of the 
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economy confirms the existence of employer-set hour thresholds for the receipt of social 
security benefits, similar to what Buchmueller and Valletta (1999) find for the case of 
employer-provided health insurance in the United States. 
As seen in the Panel A of Figure 5, the changes in the hours or work that occur after 
the reform may be explained by the increased social security benefits, which drives 
employees with high valuation for those benefits to stop working part-time without 
access to employer-provided social security benefits and start working full-time in the 
formal sector in order to get access to social security benefits for themselves and their 
families. Nevertheless, to identify the impact of the reform on hours worked it is 
important to control for the effects of other factor not related to the social security that 
may have affected the hours of work, such as the business cycle. 
 
3.4 Estimation Strategy and Results. 
 
The empirical approach I use in this chapter follows closely the one used in Chapter 
2, where I study the effect of social security contributions on wages.  The same 
identification issue present in that chapter applies here for hours worked.  The problem is 
that the econometrician can not fully observe all the non social security related factors 
that affect hours worked, making difficult to distinguish between the effects of social 
security and the effects of other variables that are correlated with both social security and 
hours worked. One example of these unobserved variables is the health of the worker. 
To get around this issue I use a differences-in-differences estimation approach that 
exploits the temporal change in the legislation introduced by the Colombian social 
security reform of 1993 and the fact that only a fraction of firms complies with the social 
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security regulations. That is, by comparing the weekly hours worked by those with social 
security benefits to the hours worked by those without benefits, and evaluating how they 
changed from before to after the reform, I can eliminate the bias due to unobserved 
heterogeneity and leave only the effect of the increased social security contributions on 
hours worked.  This estimation approach is summarized in the following reduced form 
equation of hours worked: 
             
' ' ' ' ' '




                ( ) ( ) ( )
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
H X d d X S R Y
S d S R S Y
β β β β β β i
iβ β β
= + + × + + +
+ × + × + × +υ
              (12)      
 Where  are weekly hours of work, iH iX  is a vector of demographic and job 
characteristics that affect labor supply and wages such as: education, age, age square, 
marital status, headship status, number of kids under age 6, presence of infants younger 
than 1 year, an indicator of whether the person is studying, migration status, total number 
of people in the household, the proportion of employed and unemployed in the 
household, geographical location, occupation, industry, kind of contract, tenure, firm’s 
size, and  place of work. Including hourly wages directly into equation (12) may lead to 
biased estimates since wages are affected by the availability of social security benefits, as 
I find in Chapter 2. Instead, I include a set of individual variables that affect earnings. 48 
 The business cycle variables are the deviation of real GDP from its trend, , and its 
interactions with the city, industry, occupation, tenure and skill level 
variables, ( .49 In addition,  is a dummy variable indicating whether worker i  
receives social security benefits through his/her job, is a vector of year dummies for 
id
)
                                                
i id X× iS
iY
 
48 This approach is similar to the one used by Cuttler & Madrian (1998) and Buchmueller & Valletta 
(1999), among others 
49 I estimated the business cycle using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter with lambda=6.25. 
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1994 and 1996, and iR  is a dummy variable that equals 1 during the 1992-1996 period 
and zero otherwise and aims to control for the structural changes that occurred in 
Colombia in 1990.50 I also include the interaction ( )i iS d×  to control for sector specific 
cyclical effect, and the interaction ( i iS R )×  to control for sector specific effects of the 
1990 reforms.  
 The coefficients of interest are given by the interactions of the social security dummy 
with the year fixed effects, ( , which capture the effect of the social security reform 
on hours worked.  The coefficient for the 1994 interaction measures mostly the effect of 
the pension reorganization, while the coefficient for the 1996 interaction represents the 
aggregate effect of the pension and health care reforms. As in the previous two chapters, 
it is important to point out that the coefficient for the 1994 interaction identifies the effect 
of the pension reform only if the health care reorganization that followed was not 
anticipated by the agents. If the agents anticipated the future changes in the health care 
system and reacted to them before they were actually implemented, then I can only 
identify the cumulative effect of both reforms and its timing during the reorganization 
period. 
)
                                                
i iS Y×
I estimate equation (12) using Eicker White robust standard errors to account for 
common random effects at the industry sector level. Table 11 summarizes the estimation 
results separately for men, women, and four family structure categories per gender group 
that I expect to vary on their valuation of the benefits. In this regressions the omitted 
category are unskilled married head-of-household workers of rural origin, that are not 
 
50 The main reforms during this period include the approval of a new constitution, key reforms to the labor 
market, a major trade reform, and liberalization in direct foreign investment. 
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attending school, and work without social security benefits in the service sector at firms 
that have only one employee and no fixed location. 
Table 11 
Females
WSF x Year96 -2.03 ** -1.90 -2.27 * -5.05 ** 0.12
0.85 2.27 1.19 2.23 0.90
WSF x Year94 -0.81 -1.74 1.27 -4.96 ** 0.26
0.70 1.71 1.18 1.89 0.68
WSF x Post 1990 2.40 *** 3.16 * 0.86 5.53 *** 0.20
0.69 1.53 1.07 1.70 0.58
WSF 0.27 0.58 1.44 ** 0.15 1.36 **
0.36 0.42 0.52 0.58 0.39
WSF x GDP 37.20 127.78 10.54 100.60 -48.00 *
24.70 88.86 57.09 95.24 25.40
year94 0.13 1.31 -2.25 *** 2.46 -0.64
0.64 1.61 0.76 1.61 0.70
year96 1.44 * 2.54 1.32 3.15 ** -0.13
0.68 2.14 0.97 1.47 0.92
Post 1990 -1.02 -2.08 0.37 -1.92 0.64
0.59 1.36 0.80 1.46 0.56
Males
WSF x Year96 0.11 1.38 -0.22 1.73 0.32
0.57 0.94 0.90 2.05 0.66
WSF x Year94 -0.44 0.23 -0.52 2.05 -0.40
0.48 0.68 0.97 1.51 0.48
WSF x Post 1990 0.57 0.66 0.52 -0.55 -0.21
0.46 0.79 0.64 1.45 0.37
WSF 0.12 -0.30 -0.30 0.76 0.99 **
0.33 0.30 0.42 0.56 0.35
WSF x GDP -7.39 -68.46 ** 17.44 -7.93 -23.72
15.21 29.19 31.73 72.07 24.68
year94 -0.06 -0.92 ** -0.09 -2.22 * 0.47
0.42 0.39 0.78 1.13 0.28
year96 -0.51 -1.72 ** -0.45 -1.86 -0.06
0.44 0.73 0.86 1.63 0.43
Post 1990 0.60 0.70 0.95 1.62 0.47 **
0.38 0.53 0.56 1.27 0.19
Children Head Dependant
Effect of Social Security on Hours Worked
Difference-in-Diffeence Estimation 
All Married w/o Married w/ Single Single 
 Children
 
          WSF=Wage-and-Salary Formal dummy, * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
Although Table 11 only reports the coefficients for the differences-in-differences 
variables, in these regressions most of the coefficients for the demographic, industry, city, 
occupation, and firm characteristics are statistically different from zero and have the 
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expected signs. Furthermore, the variables that control for cyclical effects at the sector, 
city, industry, occupation, tenure, and skill level also have jointly statistically significant 
coefficients.   
On each panel of Table 11, the first two rows compare the hours worked differential 
between sectors for the years 1996 and 1994 to the corresponding difference in 1992, and 
measure the effect of the reform on the relative hours of work in the formal sector. In 
addition, row 3 shows the effect of the 1990 reforms on the hours of work differential, 
row 4 shows the time invariant effect of social security contributions on hours worked, 
and row 5 represents the effect of the business-cycle on the hours of work differential. 
Finally, rows 6, 7, and 8 show the year fixed effects and the effect of the 1990 reforms 
common to both sectors. 
  The coefficient of the formal sector dummy, in Column (1), shows that females that 
have access to social security benefits work on average 0.27 hours more than those 
without access to it. Formal males, on the other hand, only work 0.12 hours more than 
their counterparts in the informal sector of the economy. This positive effect of social 
security on hours worked holds across almost all family structure groups considered and 
is related to the fact that formal firms rarely offer social security benefits to part-time 
employees. This first difference estimate is likely to be biased, however, since I can not 
isolate the effects of social security and the effects of other unobserved variables that are 
correlated with both social security and hours worked. 
Nevertheless, the differences-in-differences coefficients should eliminate the bias due 
to unobserved heterogeneity and leave only the effect of the social security reform on 
hours worked. The coefficient for the year 1994 suggests that during the first part of the 
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reform there is a 0.81 hours relative fall in the weekly hours worked by females that have 
access to employer-provided social security benefits compared to the hours of work of 
those without it. This effect progresses in such a way that by the year 1996 the work 
week for females in the formal sector is 2 hours shorter relative to the work week of those 
in the informal sector of the economy. 
Table 11 also shows that married women with children and single head-of-household 
women are the demographic categories that experience the largest effects. Married 
mothers in the formal sector decrease their relative weekly work by 2.3 hours between 
1992 and 1996, whereas single head-of-household women that have access to employer-
provided social security drop their hours of work by 5 hours relative to the weekly hours 
of those without access to benefits. These effects are equivalent to a 5% and 10% 
reduction in the weekly work of these two family structure groups, respectively. 
Similarly, the hours worked by formal married women without children decrease by 1.9 
hours relative to their counterparts in the informal sector. On the other hand, the social 
security reform increases the relative hours of work of single dependent females in the 
compliant sector by 0.12 hours, but this effect is not significantly different from zero.  It 
is important to point out that for all of these groups the effects occurs mostly during the 
first part of the reform. 
Although of a smaller magnitude, the effect of the social security reorganization is the 
opposite for males. Column (1) in Table 11 shows that between 1992 and 1996 men in 
the compliant sector of the economy increase their weekly hours of work by 0.11 hours 
compared to the hours worked by those in the non compliant sector. Among men, married 
males without children and single head-of-household men are the family structure groups 
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that experience the largest effects. Formal sector men in a childless couple increase their 
relative weekly work by 1.38 hours after the reform, whereas single head-of-household 
men that have social security benefits raise their hours of work by 1.73 hours relative to 
their counterparts in the informal sector of the economy. For both groups these effects are 
roughly equivalent to a 3% increase in their weekly hours of work. On the other hand, the 
relative hours worked by single dependent males in the formal sector increases by only 
.32 hours after the reform, while married fathers in the formal sector are the only group, 
among men, where the relative hours of work decrease, but just by 0.22 hours. It is 
important to highlight the fact that none of the effects for men are statically different 
from zero.  
To summarize, I find that the social security reform has a negative effect on the hours 
of work of women in the formal sector, reducing their weekly work by 2 hours relative to 
the weekly hours of those in the informal sector of the economy. The effect is particularly 
important among married mothers and single head-of-household women, whereas for 
married women without children, single dependent women, and men in any family 
structure group the effect is not statistically significant. 
The changes in the distribution of workers across thresholds of hours work, shown in 
Table 10, can help to clarify where the relative reduction in the hours worked by formal 
females is coming from.  The top panel of Table 10 shows that the proportion of females 
in the formal sector that work part-time increases 1 percentage point after the reform, 
with a consequent reduction in both full-time and overtime hours.  Simultaneously, 
women in the informal sector experience a 4 percentage point reduction in the fraction of 
part-time workers and a corresponding increase in the share of full-time and overtime 
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workers. This effect is particularly important among married mothers and single head-of-
household women, for whom the proportion of part-time workers decreases by 12 
percentage points.  For married mothers this translates into an increase in the fraction of 
full-time and overtime workers, whereas for single head-of-household women it only 
translates into an increase in the proportion of full-time workers.  
Moreover, I find similar results in Chapter 2 where I estimate the fraction of social 
security contributions that employers pass on to workers in the form of lower wages. My 
results indicate that the hourly wages of female workers with access to social security 
benefits decrease by 5% relative to the wages of those without access to the benefits. In 
contrast, the hourly earnings of male workers in the wage-and-salary formal sector 
increase by 2% relative to the earnings of those in the wage-and-salary informal sector.  
Similar to the hours of work results, the reduction in the relative wages of formal sector 
workers is particularly important among married mothers and single head-of-household 
women, whereas for married women without young children, single dependent women, 
and men in any family structure group the effect is not significantly different form zero.  
The effects on wages and hours worked are also linked to a change in the composition 
of employment sectors.  In Chapter 1, I study the effect of the social security 
reorganization on the employment sector choice of workers. My results indicate that, 
among females, the reform generates a 6 percentage point increase in the proportion 
formal workers, a 2.5 percentage point reduction in both self-employment and non-
market participation, and a 1 percentage point fall in salaried informality. On the other 
hand, the reform increases males’ formal employment probability by only 3 percentage 
points, reduces salaried informality by 2.5 percentage points, decreases self-employment 
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by 0.7 percentage points, and has an insignificant effect on males’ non-market 
participation. Among females, my results show that for married women the reform is the 
basis for a transition from non-market participation and self employment into formality, 
specially for those with young children. Conversely, for single head-of-household and 
single dependent women the reform causes, in addition to the previous changes, a shift 
from salaried informality into formality. 
 The previously mentioned changes in hours, wages, and employment sector 
choice are all interconnected. Before the reform, some married mothers and single head-
of-household women, who usually supply low hours of work,   did not have an incentive 
to work full-time in either the formal or the informal sector. Furthermore, since formal 
firms rarely offer benefits to part-time employees, individuals in these two demographic 
groups either worked part-time in the salaried informal and self employment sector or did 
not participate in the market at all.  The social security reform, however, increased both 
the quantity and the quality of pension and health care benefits. As mentioned in section 
3.2, this generates a jump on the workers budget constraint at the full-time threshold, 
where the height of this jump depends on the value that workers give to the benefits. This 
effect turns out to be particularly important for women on these two family structure 
groups, due to their higher valuation of the benefits, their higher degree of risk aversion, 
and their more elastic labor supply.51  Therefore, the reform made some married mothers 
and single head-of-household women that would otherwise be working part-time in the 
informal sector, or not participating in the market, to work full-time in the formal sector 
at relative lower wages in order to get access to benefits for them and their families.  This 
generated a reduction in the proportion of part-time workers in the informal sector among 
                                                 
51 See Deleire and Levy (2004), Hersch  (1998), and  Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998).  
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women in these two family structure groups, and at the same time made the pool of 
workers with social security benefits increasingly concentrated among those who work 
just enough hours to get access to the benefits. These two effects drove down the relative 
hours of work of married mothers and single head-of-household women in the formal 
sector.  
 My results for women differ from the findings of Cutler & Madrian (1998) in 
their study of the hours worked responses to rising health insurance cost in the United 
States. They find that the rapid growth in health insurance in the 1980s led to a 3% 
increase in hours of work among workers who received employer-provided health 
insurance relative to those without employer-provided health insurance. They argue that 
this occurs because health insurance is a quasi-fixed cost. Therefore, a higher the cost of 
providing the benefit increases the incentives for firms to substitute hours per worker for 
number of workers.  In Colombia, however, social security taxes are computed as a 
percentage of monthly wages. In this case, an increase in social security contributions 
affects the per hour cost of labor, while it does not affect the fixed cost of hiring 
someone. Therefore, the rapid growth in social security contributions that Colombia 
experienced during 1994 and 1995, which was partially transferred on to female workers 
in the form of lower wages, drove formal sector firms to substitute increased number of 




 In this chapter I estimate the aggregate effect of social security contributions on 
the length of the work week, controlling for individual characteristics and the effect of 
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the business cycle. I find that the social security reform has a negative effect on the hours 
of work of women in the formal sector, reducing their weekly work by 2 hours relative to 
the weekly hours of those in the informal sector of the economy. I also find that the effect 
is particularly important among married mothers and single head-of-household women, 
whereas for married women without children, single dependent women, and men in any 
family structure group the effect is not statistically significant. The effect on women is 
mostly explained by a reduction in the proportion of females that work part-time in the 
informal sector, who switched to full-time jobs in the formal sector in order to get access 
to social security benefits for themselves and their families.  
 An important caveat, however, is that the Colombian National Household Survey 
only has  information on the usual hours worked in all jobs, but not on the number of jobs 
or the average hours worked on each job. As mentioned by Cutler Madrian (1998), the 
potential for multiple job holdings may confound the results. Therefore, it is important to 
explore the incidence of multi-job holding in Colombia.  
In addition, rather than being able to vary their hours of work continuously, 
individuals could only be able to choose among a small number of hour levels offered by 
their employers. Therefore, an alternative approach that could increase our knowledge of 
the effects of social security on hours work would be to estimate a discrete model of 
hours work, where the worker chooses among four outcome categories: non-market 
participation, part-time, full-time, and overtime, and at the same time among formal or 
informal employment. This is a topic of ongoing research. 
       Finally, this chapter has concentrated on the effects of the social security reform 
on the labor supply of prime age workers. Another interesting question is to what extent 
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pension and health insurance availability affect the retirement decision of workers. In this 
area it would be important to take into consideration the different retirement ages for men 
a women present in Colombia. Furthermore, it would be interesting to know how 
informal workers support themselves in retirement, the post-retirement health insurance 
options of different types of workers, and how all these factors affect their retirement 











































































chi2 P>chi2 chi2 P>chi2 chi2 P>chi2 chi2 P>chi2 chi2 P>chi2 chi2 P>chi2 chi2 P>chi2 chi2 P>chi2 chi2 P>chi2 chi2 P>chi2 chi2 P>chi2 chi2 P>chi2
GDP 40 0.00 16 0.00 22 0.00 10 0.02 112 0.00 4 0.31 96 0.00 110 0.00 14 0.00 12 0.01 18 0.00 13 0.00
Post 1990 Dummy 34 0.00 39 0.00 10 0.02 54 0.00 5 0.20 15 0.00 5 0.16 13 0.00 4 0.32 13 0.01 10 0.02 13 0.00
Year 1994 49 0.00 14 0.00 51 0.00 36 0.00 46 0.00 5 0.16 41 0.00 73 0.00 31 0.00 16 0.00 10 0.02 2 0.50
Year 1996 127 0.00 93 0.00 178 0.00 21 0.00 28 0.00 3 0.38 118 0.00 58 0.00 12 0.01 15 0.00 46 0.00 18 0.00
Age 4271 0.00 1624 0.00 1343 0.00 250 0.00 1432 0.00 1362 0.00 1993 0.00 2038 0.00 435 0.00 296 0.00 930 0.00 299 0.00
Age Sqr 3109 0.00 1627 0.00 1204 0.00 137 0.00 1206 0.00 793 0.00 1833 0.00 2529 0.00 278 0.00 252 0.00 755 0.00 259 0.00
Basic 132 0.00 9 0.03 26 0.00 24 0.00 5 0.14 2 0.55 8 0.05 7 0.07 16 0.00 4 0.31 19 0.00 6 0.11
High School 197 0.00 41 0.00 110 0.00 3 0.46 14 0.00 9 0.03 42 0.00 3 0.36 2 0.63 19 0.00 52 0.00 4 0.22
Some College 44 0.00 31 0.00 7 0.07 9 0.02 17 0.00 3 0.42 17 0.00 2 0.63 2 0.60 3 0.34 24 0.00 4 0.29
College 16 0.00 17 0.00 58 0.00 3 0.38 25 0.00 17 0.00 66 0.00 46 0.00 7 0.07 3 0.33 52 0.00 2 0.57
New Migrant 113 0.00 52 0.00 26 0.00 4 0.31 6 0.12 23 0.00 173 0.00 10 0.02 110 0.00 10 0.02 4 0.23 17 0.00
1 year Migrant 88 0.00 29 0.00 102 0.00 16 0.00 19 0.00 11 0.01 8 0.04 9 0.03 13 0.00 6 0.12 29 0.00 7 0.06
Rural Origin 256 0.00 46 0.00 20 0.00 8 0.05 25 0.00 29 0.00 21 0.00 25 0.00 7 0.08 54 0.00 103 0.00 29 0.00
Studing 726 0.00 57 0.00 232 0.00 62 0.00 1615 0.00 55 0.00 1446 0.00 174 0.00 210 0.00 194 0.00 304 0.00 64 0.00
Household Characteristics
Expenditure Unit 377 0.00 1340 0.00 112 0.00 101 0.00 362 0.00 27 0.00 1476 0.00 140 0.00 412 0.00 26 0.00 299 0.00 38 0.00
Num Emp 1618 0.00 4564 0.00 26511 0.00 1581 0.00 7900 0.00 697 0.00 9754 0.00 5324 0.00 1209 0.00 381 0.00 6113 0.00 319 0.00
Num Unemp 1130 0.00 277 0.00 54 0.00 116 0.00 1425 0.00 76 0.00 4078 0.00 2178 0.00 1587 0.00 155 0.00 1342 0.00 1046 0.00
City
B/manga 198 0.00 30 0.00 8 0.05 25 0.00 30 0.00 23 0.00 63 0.00 13 0.00 39 0.00 61 0.00 87 0.00 47 0.00
Bogota 1732 0.00 2189 0.00 374 0.00 191 0.00 1922 0.00 33 0.00 792 0.00 1186 0.00 994 0.00 92 0.00 104 0.00 325 0.00
Manizales 244 0.00 46 0.00 92 0.00 1304 0.00 771 0.00 19 0.00 2504 0.00 19 0.00 275 0.00 68 0.00 287 0.00 61 0.00
Medellin 214 0.00 115 0.00 151 0.00 7 0.08 102 0.00 13 0.01 63 0.00 57 0.00 4 0.28 18 0.00 3 0.34 4 0.22
Cali 495 0.00 596 0.00 477 0.00 28 0.00 75 0.00 44 0.00 2818 0.00 61 0.00 0 0.93 26 0.00 1447 0.00 20 0.00
Pasto 3326 0.00 1731 0.00 292 0.00 72 0.00 1684 0.00 318 0.00 1911 0.00 1307 0.00 4585 0.00 389 0.00 2268 0.00 226 0.00
v/cio 711 0.00 7233 0.00 173 0.00 133 0.00 157 0.00 160 0.00 416 0.00 620 0.00 1406 0.00 174 0.00 75 0.00 23 0.00
pereira 407 0.00 101 0.00 137 0.00 42 0.00 20 0.00 75 0.00 249 0.00 139 0.00 34 0.00 22 0.00 504 0.00 528 0.00
cucuta 9 0.03 61 0.00 11 0.01 5 0.18 11 0.01 112 0.00 34 0.00 159 0.00 3 0.45 23 0.00 64 0.00 12 0.01
city2gdp 232 0.00 32 0.00 10 0.02 32 0.00 32 0.00 31 0.00 109 0.00 17 0.00 42 0.00 60 0.00 139 0.00 35 0.00
city3gdp 2231 0.00 2649 0.00 392 0.00 262 0.00 2695 0.00 56 0.00 2045 0.00 1468 0.00 1649 0.00 93 0.00 217 0.00 295 0.00
city4gdp 91 0.00 32 0.00 207 0.00 1500 0.00 1227 0.00 33 0.00 4559 0.00 69 0.00 526 0.00 86 0.00 351 0.00 71 0.00
city5gdp 310 0.00 214 0.00 193 0.00 9 0.04 99 0.00 21 0.00 225 0.00 131 0.00 9 0.03 18 0.00 12 0.01 6 0.13
city6gdp 623 0.00 646 0.00 521 0.00 21 0.00 92 0.00 68 0.00 3612 0.00 230 0.00 8 0.05 22 0.00 1073 0.00 36 0.00
city7gdp 1964 0.00 1338 0.00 864 0.00 62 0.00 1714 0.00 266 0.00 2133 0.00 836 0.00 5361 0.00 417 0.00 2773 0.00 225 0.00
city8gdp 866 0.00 7871 0.00 100 0.00 100 0.00 192 0.00 180 0.00 441 0.00 750 0.00 1665 0.00 208 0.00 54 0.00 27 0.00
city9gdp 447 0.00 117 0.00 331 0.00 48 0.00 33 0.00 91 0.00 80 0.00 106 0.00 31 0.00 26 0.00 420 0.00 594 0.00
city10gdp 10 0.02 53 0.00 12 0.01 4 0.25 10 0.02 111 0.00 32 0.00 175 0.00 3 0.39 23 0.00 58 0.00 12 0.01
edu2gdp 63 0.00 10 0.02 22 0.00 19 0.00 8 0.04 2 0.53 7 0.09 14 0.00 18 0.00 2 0.50 24 0.00 5 0.16
edu3gdp 116 0.00 33 0.00 82 0.00 4 0.28 27 0.00 4 0.22 66 0.00 3 0.34 5 0.15 14 0.00 67 0.00 5 0.19
edu4gdp 15 0.00 10 0.02 3 0.45 3 0.32 34 0.00 6 0.10 27 0.00 6 0.11 3 0.38 4 0.26 31 0.00 2 0.59
edu5gdp 46 0.00 22 0.00 46 0.00 7 0.08 48 0.00 12 0.01 127 0.00 74 0.00 16 0.00 4 0.25 53 0.00 5 0.21
Joint Test of Significance
Post 1990 Dummy 383 0.00 127 0.00 189 0.00 57 0.00 67 0.00 31 0.00 212 0.00 234 0.00 47 0.00 29 0.00 96 0.00 21 0.00
Age 2E+04 0.00 3E+03 0.00 1E+03 0.00 1E+03 0.00 3E+03 0.00 2E+03 0.00 5E+03 0.00 6E+03 0.00 3E+03 0.00 4E+02 0.00 4E+03 0.00 4E+02 0.00
Education 1683 0.00 521 0.00 552 0.00 191 0.00 578 0.00 122 0.00 547 0.00 395 0.00 170 0.00 272 0.00 161 0.00 85 0.00
Migration 154 0.00 71 0.00 137 0.00 23 0.00 29 0.00 91 0.00 276 0.00 33 0.00 123 0.00 30 0.00 54 0.00 21 0.00
Expenditure Unit 5E+04 0.00 1E+04 0.00 4E+04 0.00 6E+03 0.00 2E+04 0.00 3E+03 0.00 4E+03 0.00 2E+04 0.00 1E+04 0.00 6E+03 0.00 4E+04 0.00 4E+03 0.00
City 5E+05 0.00 2E+06 0.00 1E+06 0.00 2E+07 0.00 7E+05 0.00 3E+05 0.00 5E+05 0.00 3E+05 0.00 2E+06 0.00 3E+07 0.00 8E+06 0.00 4E+05 0.00
City x GDP 7E+05 0.00 2E+06 0.00 1E+06 0.00 2E+07 0.00 7E+05 0.00 3E+05 0.00 7E+05 0.00 5E+05 0.00 3E+06 0.00 1E+07 0.00 3E+06 0.00 6E+05 0.00













Wald Test of Significance of the Coefficients Across Equations





Table 2.a  
Omitted chi2 df P>chi2 evidence Omitted chi2 df P>chi2 evidence
All WSF 272.06 93 0.00 against Ho NMP 6.78 94 1.00 for Ho
WSI 92.43 93 0.50 for Ho WSI 17.80 94 1.00 for Ho
SLF 66.11 93 0.98 for Ho SLF 32.25 93 1.00 for Ho
Married WSF -24.53 78 1.00 for Ho NMP 1.43 78 1.00 for Ho
No WSI -2.48 77 1.00 for Ho WSI 2.60 78 1.00 for Ho
Children SLF 13.66 78 1.00 for Ho SLF 13.16 77 1.00 for Ho
Married WSF 54.48 78 0.98 for Ho NMP 0.22 77 1.00 for Ho
Children WSI 3.82 78 1.00 for Ho WSI 5.54 77 1.00 for Ho
SLF 26.67 78 1.00 for Ho SLF -2.68 77 1.00 for Ho
Single NMP 1.67 76 1.00 for Ho NMP 0.61 77 1.00 for Ho
Head WSI -1.63 77 1.00 for Ho WSI 3.06 76 1.00 for Ho
SLF 5.56 76 1.00 for Ho SLF 7.65 77 1.00 for Ho
Single WSF 19.18 77 1.00 for Ho WSF 30.23 78 1.00 for Ho
Dependant WSI 3.06 77 1.00 for Ho WSI 15.05 78 1.00 for Ho
SLF 3.27 77 1.00 for Ho SLF 9.15 78 1.00 for Ho
Non-Single WSF 5.24 78 1.00 for Ho NMP 0.89 78 1.00 for Ho
Dependant WSI 2.18 77 1.00 for Ho WSI 4.34 77 1.00 for Ho
SLF 1.84 78 1.00 for Ho SLF 3.01 78 1.00 for Ho
Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives
Females Males
 Hausman Tests of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption
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